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The fundamental purpose of my thesis is to consider the ongoing formation of European identity 
within the context of the contemporary refugee/migrant crisis in Europe. In doing so, I will 
briefly survey how a European identity has been conceived and constructed through legal 
documents, treaties, and political speeches. Moreover, I will use different theories such as 
Anderson’s imagined communities to consider whether European identity is post-modern and 
post-national as it is sometimes celebrated to be. The EU is frequently regarded as a unique 
experiment in history and the first real post-modern political entity. However, looking deeper 
into the identity construction process, it does not seem to reflect a post-national construction but 
rather an identity often constructed on national and primordial resources, making the EU more 
supranational than a post-national entity. This is particularly true in relation to the refugee crisis 
which has been framed as a threat to European identity and culture. The role of borders, the 
Mediterranean Sea, and fortress Europe are critical terms I will analyze to consider the refugee 
crisis case study. Refugees have become the “other” or the “enemy” in contrast to the 
“Europeans.” Migrants are seen as a threat to one’s culture and identity, but if the European 
identity is still evolving and not clearly defined, how can migrants pose a threat to it? The 
migrant crisis provides the context that clearly demonstrates the contradictions and paradox 
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1. Introduction  
 One of the most recurrent questions throughout my thesis is to understand if a 
European identity can be described as post-national and postmodern or if its construction is 
similar to the nation-states, making it a supranational form of identity. In the last few years, the 
question of identity has become more pressing for policymakers and politicians in Europe. The 
majority of individuals have a strong national identity, considered exclusive and unique; 
however, as we know, individuals can enjoy multiple identities without any necessary 
contradictions between them. The European identity question is more ambiguous because it goes 
beyond national identification, and it presumably coexists with different local, regional, and 
supranational identities. After the World Wars, Europe developed two main ideas for political 
integration for the EU. One conceived of a European political entity as a federation similar to the 
United States of America. The other has focused on a balance of power and identities 
cooperating within the same political entity, a sort of "confederation option" we can say.  
There have been a series of initiatives to promote a European identity, and I will briefly 
analyze them in my literature review.  In 1973, the Nine Members of the EC decided to draft a 
document specifically focused on European identity with the precise objective of building a 
stronger united Europe. The Maastricht Treaty (1991) shaped for the first time the idea of 
European citizenship, giving Europeans a sense of exclusiveness and belonging to something 
unique. The treaty also highlights the importance of education, culture, youth, and legal powers 
in citizens' everyday life, assuming that symbols play a vital role in constructing a common 
identity in Europe. Ironically, these symbols' creation is very similar to a nationalistic way of 




For this reason, one of the most recurrent questions throughout my thesis is whether a European 
identity can be described as post-national and postmodern, or if its construction is similar to the 
nation-states, making it a supranational form of identity. 
Author Stefan Höjelid in his essay “European Integration and the idea of European 
Identity: Obstacles and Possibilities” divides the literature into two specific categories. Scholars 
with a pessimistic view, usually nationalists, and scholars with optimistic views toward the 
integration process in Europe.1According to nationalists such as Antony Smith, the nation is the 
only criteria to analyze a form of identity. A modern society needs a certain level of loyalty and 
solidarity, and this is only possible when there is a nation with a national identity. National 
identity remains thus the most important form of identification. 
Nevertheless, going back to the discourse of multiple identities, individuals can have 
more than one identity, making European identity possible. This is the main argument for my 
thesis; a European identity is possible. It exists on an individual level; however, it falls into an 
ambiguous category since it encompasses 27 different countries with their own cultures and 
languages. Some educational programs such as Erasmus and Euro-festivals have been partially 
successful in unifying European citizens, and Eurobarometer surveys show an attachment to 
Europe amongst a significant population.  
 Questions of identity are inextricably related to migration issues because crises such as 
the refugee one, have made the question of finding a common European identity more pressing 
and urgent. With the arrival of masses of refugees on European soil, the EU was caught by 
surprise, incapable of finding and adopting a common policy demonstrating a level of solidarity 
 
1 Höjelid, Stefan. “European integration and the idea of European identity: obstacles and possibilites.” In ECPR 





with all member states. The years 2015/2016 are considered the peak of the emergency and the 
beginning of a European crisis characterized by a deep political instability from the member 
states. The first response of the EU was a standard agreement in sharing the responsibilities of 
refugees among member states. The response was a failure both in registering refugees entering 
the countries and sharing responsibilities for them between nation-states. In the absence of a firm 
EU policy, governments took national measures to close and tighten borders, often violating the 
Schengen agreements and laws in Europe. Legal and administrative responsibilities were put in 
the hands of countries located in southern Europe and the Mediterranean, already financially and 
economically unstable, to deal with the significant inflow of migrants and refugees. The 
consequence was the resurgence of populist, nationalist and right-wing parties all around Europe.   
Despite praising itself for its borderless policy and free mobility, Europe has become a 
fortress with a strong reintroduction of borders to avoid immigrants moving from one part of the 
continent to another. European identity is then showing its exclusive character in which some 
can enter fortress Europe, and some are inevitably excluded. From here, we can see the paradox 
of the European identity, which praises itself for its inclusiveness toward different cultures while 











2. Literature Review  
This thesis will investigate and analyze the dynamics of building and maintaining 
European identity. I explore the ways it is different from a national identity, since it goes beyond 
alliances between particular nation-states and presumes a supranational identity that is not 
supposed to conflict with or contradict single individual national identities. The main question is 
whether citizens can have two layers of political identity, their national one as well as a 
European one. In order to do so, I analyze whether the EU builds its political identities on civic 
and inclusive sources or if it engenders primordial and exclusive forms of identity construction. 
The meaning and construction of a European identity will be explored within the context of the 
European Migrant Crisis, considered one of the biggest challenges and threats to European 
identity and culture.  
Since the creation of a European integration process, the existence of a European identity 
has been one of the most debated topics throughout Europe. Can a genuine European identity 
exist and is it necessary to support the construction of a political entity like the EU? The idea of a 
united Europe is not completely new but dates back in history to the Roman Empire; both 
Napoleon and Charlemagne had ambitions to unify the majority of Europe. The European Union 
is a very new kind of political entity, created in 1951 with the main idea of a “United States of 
Europe” to avoid future conflicts after the tragedy of the World Wars. For instance, John Ruggie, 
Professor and expert in international politics, defined the EU as the first post-modern polity.2 
Scholars and politicians of the time such as Jürgen Habermas or Robert Schuman often seen the 
EU as a successful experiment that was able to overcome the modern age characterized by an 
 
2 Ruggie, John Gerard. "Territoriality and beyond: problematizing modernity in international 





extremist form of nationalism. After the unification of Europe, one of the most pressing issues 
has been the development of an identity that can accompany this political institution; more 
specifically, a European identity that can coexist with the other national identities of every single 
member state. The EU is currently formed by 27 different member states, each with their own 
culture, languages, traditions, religions, and different ethnic communities, all united under the 
same political institution and possible identity. Central to the European Commission has been the 
development of two layers of political identity with a post-national form of European identity, 
able to go beyond the Westphalian system. But another question that arises is whether the EU 
can be considered as a post-modern nation which can coexist within the same territory of 
existing nations, or is it replacing nationalism and national identities?  My thesis addresses these 
questions; nevertheless, there are no final answers and the process of defining a European 
identity poses a series of problems.  
Scholars are deeply divided when it comes to identity issues. Some of them, such as the 
founding fathers of the EU, highlight the uniqueness together with the postmodern/post-national 
character of the EU; while others, such as Antony Smith or Rainer Hüssle, are more reluctant in 
considering the EU as a post-modern nation since a European identity seems more guided by 
principles of exclusion of immigrants leading Europe to a more national form of identity or, to 
better say, to a more supra-national identity rather than post-national.   
The starting point to investigate the meaning and existence of a European identity is the 
concept of collective or social identities. The majority of scholars agree that individuals can have 
multiple identities in the contemporary world and these identities can either reinforce or diminish 
a sense of attachment to national identity. Individuals can live with multiple identifications and 




circumstances. Individual identity is usually referred to as how individuals identify themselves 
and are identified by others in different ways, depending on different situations with an element 
of the distinctiveness of the individual. Collective identities, on the other side, go beyond 
individuality and refer to a sense of belonging to a specific social group in which the identity of 
the group becomes part of the individual identity, for instance, the sense of belonging to the same 
nation-state. As author Klaus Eder affirms in his essay “A Theory of Collective Identity Making 
Sense of the Debate on a European Identity”: “Collective identity has been at the center of 
attention in societies that were formed in the course of the making of the nation-state. The nation, 
however, has not been an exclusive focus. Collective identity can equally refer to cities, to 
regions, or to groups such as political parties or even social movements. For some time, 
collective identity has also been an issue with regard to Europe where public debate is 
increasingly concerned with the problem of a European identity that is seen as lacking or as 
necessary.”3  
The typical elements of a national identity can be found in the importance of territory, 
sharing the same myths and historical memories, a common culture and a system of legal rights 
and institutions. British sociologist Anthony Smith in his essay “National Identity and the Idea of 
European Unity”, defines a nation as: “a named human population sharing a historical territory, 
common memories and myths of origin, a mass, standardized public culture, a common 
economy, and territorial mobility, and common legal rights and duties for all members of the 
collectivity”4. Nationalisms start from the premises of exclusive identities to unify the national 
and have a distinct individuality falling under this category. For this reason, Anthony Smith 
 
3 Eder, Klaus. "A theory of collective identity making sense of the debate on a ‘European identity’." European 
journal of social theory 12, no. 4 (2009): 428.  




remains skeptical about whether a European identity can be constructed in the absence of a 
common history, language, and ethnic bonds and many critics agree with him in affirming there 
is no basis to a Europe as a cultural community due to the diversity of national culture and the 
lack of a common language.  
On the contrary, other authors agree on how collective identities are constantly 
challenged and reconstructed rather than fixed and stable. The question that Smith is trying to 
answer is whether Europe is the dream of political unity without nationalistic trappings or if it is 
a simple repetition of a national identity formation on a larger scale. More specifically, is a 
European identity and a political community possible when the nation-state has been assumed as 
the only unit to support a legitimate government and political community? Or is a unified Europe 
a sort of supernation? From one side, the European national identity can come into conflict with 
the national ones, which often happened in foreign policy matters, for instance, with the 
Yugoslav conflict. On another level, though, I agree with the idea that individuals are today more 
prone to choose to which nation they belong to, and there are no evident contradictions between 
these two types of identities.  
In Thomas Risse’s book, A Community of Europeans?, collective identities are seen as 
the link between the individuals and the social groups; therefore, this identity derives from the 
sense of belonging to a specific social group together with the feeling of attachment and a sense 
of obligation to it.5 The difference between the self and the other is fundamental, as in every type 
of identity, but individuals do not always express identification to a single group, holding 
multiple forms of identities depending on the specific situation they find themselves in.  
Policymakers in Europe widely assume that national and European identities can coexist without 
 





any contrast and the same motto of the EU, “unity in diversity”, celebrates the diversity of the 
EU as an advantage. A concrete example in Europe of this coexistence is the national flag 
displayed with the European one in public buildings, schools, driver licenses, or even diplomas. 
Primordial identities vs civic identities 
According to German author Rainer Hüssle, in his essay “Imagine the EU: the 
metaphorical construction of a supra-nationalist identity”, there are three fundamental aspects 
connected to identity: the fact that collective identities are social constructions, there is no 
identity without difference, and there are two different types of collective identities, primordial 
and civic.6 These basic assumptions are shared in most studies concerning European identity, but 
there is often disagreement on the question whether European identity as more primordial or 
civic. Collective identities are based upon features typical of the collectivity, such as a common 
language, culture, ethnicity and traditions. As Hüssle says: “Collective identities constructed 
according to the primordial type are based (more exactly: are imagined to be based) on some 
inherent characteristics of the collectivity, for example, a common culture, language or 
ethnicity.”7 They are imagined identities, based on a deep sense of belonging to a specific 
territory united by ethnic bonds. Germany is usually considered as an example of primordial 
identity even if, after World War II, civic elements were introduced in their current form of 
identity. 
 On the other side, collective civic identities are not naturally given or imagined but the 
result of social interaction between people and the sense of belonging to a political entity. 
According to Hüssle: “Collective identity constructed according to the civic type, in contrast, is 
 
6 Hülsse, Rainer. "Imagine the EU: the metaphorical construction of a supra-nationalist identity." Journal of 
International Relations and Development 9, no. 4 (2006): 398. 




not imagined to be a natural given but it results from social interaction within a political entity. 
Rather than identifying with a nation (defined through a common culture), people identify with a 
state (Bruter 2005: 12).”8 This type of identity is a politically acquired identity rather than 
naturally inherited, and France is often taken as an example of civic identity. A way to sum up 
the difference is thinking of primordial identities as strictly connected to cultural sources of 
identification and civic identities connected to political sources of identification.  
Another distinction made by the author is the mode of differentiation, digital and analog. 
He says “The second dimension of my identity-model focuses on the ‘mode of differentiation’ 
(Ruggie 1993: 168, emphasis added) between the self and other. I take up Iver Neumann’s 
(1998) distinction between a ‘digital’ and an ‘analog’ mode, each describing a particular way of 
organizing the boundary between the self and other (also Wæver 2004: 210).”9 The digital mode 
of differentiation constructs the other in opposition to the self in which the other is automatically 
excluded. In an analog mode of differentiation, the difference between the self and the other is 
not particularly strong and absolute. As a consequence, a digital mode of differentiation will 
produce exclusive identities; while an analog mode of differentiation will produce inclusive 
identities with a wider acceptance of the other. In other words, a digital mode of differentiation 
can be associated with modernity; while an analog mode of differentiation is typical of post-
modernity.  
The question is now, in which category does European identity belong? As we said 
before, European identity falls into a sense of belonging to the same political community rather 
than a naturally given identity; however, some characteristics such as the importance of 
 
8 Hülsse, Rainer. "Imagine the EU: the metaphorical construction of a supra-nationalist identity." Journal of 
International Relations and Development 9, no. 4 (2006): 399. 




territorial borders, the imposition of recurrent EU symbols and the exclusion of some countries 
on the European soil, such as Turkey, portray the EU identity in a more digital than analog way. 
Anderson’s concept of imagined communities will be essential to better understand this question. 
How is Europe imagined?  
Hüssle’s text on the metaphorical construction of a supra-nationalist identity offers 
important insights into the metaphors and images used in political speeches and discourses to 
show how the EU seemed configured in discourse by politicians and statemen. The author argues 
that identities are imagined as much as they are constructed through metaphors and the use of a 
specific language. There is a lack of research and literature on the use of European identity 
through metaphors and political discourses; however, analyzing the language of international 
politics can be a very powerful instrument to have a better idea of how the European identity was 
conceived. Metaphors are figures of speech in which a word is used to substitute the correct 
terms, but they are also more than simple substitutes for the original words and they can help us 
to understand the political thinking behind the concept of European identity.  
For his analysis, Hüssle starts from the EU enlargement to the East as a fundamental 
political event for Europe in the '90s. After the Cold War, countries belonging to the block under 
Soviet control expressed their desire to become members of the EU and negotiations started 
around 1997. Political discourses used at the enlargement process seemed to build European 
identity in a very specific way. Most of the speeches the author analyzes are focused on German 
discourses and debates in the parliament that were happening at that time. Germany was one of 
the biggest supporters of the EU enlargement toward the east. The author finds, for instance, that 
some metaphors used in political discourses, such as the “family reunion”, the “homecoming”, 




countries (very popular among German politicians), clearly show a primordial way of 
constructing identity. The Eastern countries are portrayed as naturally belonging to the EU, as 
part of the same organism or family whose separation was temporary.  
European identity is based here on natural sources as an organism in which every EU 
country is part of and it is an example of an identity construction based on primordial sources. 
Therefore, countries that are part of the European organism can not be denied entry to the EU 
since, as the author says: “Countries that are part of the European organism cannot be denied 
accession to the EU as their separation from the EU is an unnatural state”10.  
The only metaphor that seems to construct a more civic form of European identity is, 
according to him, the metaphor of the enlargement as a common path in which candidates to the 
EU are seen to be on the same path or on the same way to the EU. There is no natural connection 
or cultural basis for this identity. The metaphor of “the path” portrays European identity as 
political cooperation and integration between countries that are on the same path and it is mostly 
based on civic sources. Another metaphor constructed through civic sources is the one referring 
to the East enlargement as an “entry into a house”, in which the EU members are considered as 
inside the house and the candidates as waiting outside the house. This metaphor, like the path 
one, constructs a European identity based on civic sources in which member states are living and 
interacting in the same house. However, this metaphor also highlights the difference between 
who is inside and who is outside, and once again the problem of inclusive and exclusive 
identities emerges. It is important to acknowledge how these metaphors mostly come from a 
German perspective, and as we know, primordial elements are stronger in German culture 
compared to other European states. However, they still show how identity was conceived at the 
 
10 Hülsse, Rainer. "Imagine the EU: the metaphorical construction of a supra-nationalist identity." Journal of 




time through primordial sources using a digital mode of differentiation, dividing certain 
categories of countries from others.  
After analyzing different metaphors used in speeches in German politics, Hüssle 
questions the postmodernity character of the EU and its identity. He states:   
The family metaphor, the homecoming metaphor and the metaphor of growing together 
primordialize European identity and set up a digital mode of differentiation. In this way, 
European identity looks very similar to German identity. Obviously, there is nothing 
post-modern about it, it is very much in line with modern, nationalist ways of 
constructing identity (……) However, only one of the metaphors discussed actually 
constructs the European identity in a post-modern/post-national way: the path metaphor 
not only bases European identity on civic sources but also breaks with the habit of 
imagining identity exclusively. Here, the other is no longer absolutely different, but only 
different in degree. The self and other are not separated by a clearcut border, instead they 
are connected by a transition zone, which can make it difficult to say where the self ends 
and the other begins.11 
 
These metaphors are very much in line with nationalism and a national way of 
constructing identity. However, the metaphors of the house and the path constructs a European 
identity as a combination of civic sources and digital mode of differentiation very similar to a 
French form of identity. This type of identity is less nationalist and the distinction between the 
self and the other is less underlined since the other can become part of the self. Again, the 
process of constructing a European identity is ambiguous and both primordial and civic sources 
are used. Nevertheless, the author seems to lean more toward a nationalistic construction of the 





11 Hülsse, Rainer. "Imagine the EU: the metaphorical construction of a supra-nationalist identity." Journal of 




Europe as an imagined community in the making   
Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of 
Nationalism is the most influential book on nationalism. According to Anderson:  
The nation is imagined as limited because even the largest of them, encompassing 
perhaps a billion living human beings, has finite, if elastic, boundaries, beyond which lie 
other nations. (…) It is imagined as sovereign because the concept was born in an age in 
which Enlightenment and Revolution were destroying the legitimacy of the divinely-
ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm. (…) Finally, it is imagined as a community, 
because, regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the 
nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship.12  
 
Anderson argues that the nation is an imagined political community because it is 
impossible to know every single other person that belongs to one’s nation, therefore he uses the 
term “imagined”13.The same can be said for Europe; citizens of Europe can not meet every other 
European or know every aspect of Europe. The nation is then limited in scope and sovereign in 
nature and its border is well defined but changeable at the same time. As we know, the borders of 
the European Union are flexible and they lack a complete definition; moreover, they have 
changed over times and they keep changing as we can see with Brexit. The EU expanded to 
adjacent countries and was able to integrate different borders. Sovereignty is also partially given 
up by different member states, but the identity and freedom of every single nation-state still 
matter.  
According to Anderson, language is another important factor for the modern nation and a 
nation's consciousness since it creates a stronger sense of unification. He observes: “Particular 
languages can die or be wiped out, but there was and is no possibility of humankind's general 
 
12Anderson, Benedict. Imagined communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism. Verso books, 
2006,6/7.  




linguistic unification. Yet this mutual incomprehensibility was historically of only slight 
importance until capitalism and print created monoglot mass reading publics.”14  
According to him, capitalism and the diffusion of printed documents and books played an 
important role in the diffusion of a national or standard language. In Europe, there is no national 
newspaper or tv channel, or a radio broadcast that can reach the majority of Europeans and 
connect them into an imagined community; therefore, Europeans are not informed of what is 
happening in the other European countries even if they may be briefly exposed to the news 
coming from neighboring countries. Media is, without any doubt, an important instrument to 
diffuse an image of a nation, and Europe lacks in the construction of a media that can reach 
every single European state, despite several attempts in creating a unified media system. The 
Internet constitutes a very powerful instrument that would be able to access a large portion of 
Europeans, but it has not been explored by European politicians in favor of a European identity.  
Authors Cirila Toplak & Irena Šumi in their essay “Europe (an Union): Imagined 
Community in the Making?”, seem to come to the same conclusions as Hüssle. Through the 
analysis of EU documents and important political speeches, they argue that reinforcement of a 
European identity is not possible since most EU policies that have been adopted have a counter-
productive effect on the creation of a common identity. The authors point out the lack of efforts 
from EU politicians in creating a strong form of identity through EU policies, despite the 
increasing awareness that in creating a common identity is an essential element for the 
integration process. There is a paradox in the way European identity is considered a priority 
within the EU’s political agenda, but citizens in the EU do not seem to identify with Europe and 
 







have a strong identity. The main problem is that the idea of European identity that was imposed 
on EU citizens was more similar to a supranational identity reinforced by the single national 
identities. As a consequence, this identity is often seen as in contrast to the national ones. The 
two authors join Hüssle in a shared skepticism that the EU is a unique and unprecedented 
experiment in history. As Toplak & Šumi say:  
EU politicians appear to conceive of European identity as construed similarly to national 
identities, although a European nation that would have to develop such sense of 
belonging remains politically highly improbable. In the last two decades in particular we 
have witnessed adoption and implementation of a whole range of policies seemingly 
aiming at that objective, such as new symbols of Europe, the emerging common 
European cultural policy, the European citizenship/passport, the recent attempts at formal 
unification of European foreign policy and, above all, the European currency.15  
 
They analyze the idea of a common identity from the perspective of Anderson’s imagined 
community to find out how the EU policies do not always support the idea of a European 
integration project. Their analysis shows how this identity is often constructed in a very similar 
way to national identities. There has been a process of adopting a series of policies aiming at 
creating a European identity similar to a national one, for instance, the creation of European 
symbols: European citizenship, passport, same currency, car tags, a national anthem, a common 
European cultural policy and more. Currency in particular plays a fundamental role in the 
construction of a common identity since a common currency can highlight the sense of belonging 
to the same community. Political discourses on European identity can give a better idea of how 
this identity was primarily conceived from a national point of view. For instance, Robert 
Schuman, considered as one of the founding fathers of Europe, states in his declaration the need 
 
15 Toplak, Cirila, and Irena Šumi. “Europe(an Union): Imagined Community in the Making?” Journal of 




for a common economic system in Europe, referring to the need for a “European spirit” as a 
sense of belonging to the same national consciousness.16      
Another important contribution to the discussion of European identity comes from 
German philosopher and sociologist Jürgen Habermas who believed in the idea of reinforcing a 
European identity through the creation of a common constitution: “Why should we pursue the 
project of a constitution for Europe? Let me address this question from two angles: (i) immediate 
political goals, and (ii) dilemmas stemming from virtually irreversible decisions of the past. If we 
consider the first, it is clear that while the original political aims of European integration have 
lost much of their relevance, they have since been replaced by an even more ambitious political 
agenda.”17 Habermas argues that the only way to continue the integration process in Europe is a 
common constitution able to preserve a sense of consciousness among citizens and to reach 
fundamental political goals for the union. For him, a common currency is not going to keep 
Europeans united, and he criticizes the previous treaties elaborated by the EU as ineffective. The 
idea of a European constitution was not welcomed by countries such as France and Britain and 
brought a wave of skepticism around Europe. As he says “Let us then start from the question: 
why should we pursue the project of an ‘ever-closer Union’ any further at all? Recent calls from 
Rau, Schroeder and Fischer—the German President, Chancellor and Foreign Minister—to move 
ahead with a European Constitution have met skeptical reactions in Great Britain, France and 
most of the other member-states.”18 Habermas was probably conceiving of political identity 
having Germany in his mind. Germany is often considered as an example of political evolution, 
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being the only European democracy based on an imagined community united by a strong ethnic 
nationalism, able to function as a political community with civic nationalism.  
The Maastricht Treaty in 1991 developed by the European Commission aimed at the 
reinforcement of European identity through European citizenship granted to every EU citizen 
and a common currency, the euro. We can see here a sense of exclusiveness developed in the 
idea of sharing the same citizenship. The common citizenship and currency are part of a series of 
national symbols that were progressively imposed by the EU, such as the common flag and the 
national anthem. The idea of a “European Federation” or “United States of Europe” probably 
crossed the minds of EU politicians at the time with the majority of them having the model of the 
United States in mind.  
In the Document on the European Identity elaborated on December 14, 1973, in 
Copenhagen, the importance of introducing the concept of European identity for foreign relations 
was clearly stated for the first time. As the document states: “The Nine Member Countries of the 
European Communities have decided that the time has come to draw up a document on the 
European Identity. This will enable them to achieve a better definition of their relations with 
other countries and of their responsibilities and the place which they occupy in world affairs.”19         
Here European identity is defined by salient concepts such as representative democracy, the rule 
of law, social justice, and respect for human rights together with the importance of a common 
market. Article 3 states that “The diversity of cultures within the framework of a common 
European civilization, the attachment to common values and principles, the increasing 
convergence of attitudes to life, the awareness of having specific interests in common and the 
determination to take part in the construction of a United Europe, all give the European Identity 
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its originality and its own dynamism.”20 Unity is also strongly stressed through the diversity of 
cultures together with the attachment to common values and having the same interests. In this 
document, citizens are mainly united by a common attachment to the same principles, and the 
European identity is mainly conceived as a political one that complements the national 
identification to the member state.  
These legal documents show how the meaning of a European identity acquires more 
importance and a clearer purpose through the years. As I mentioned before, the EU enlargement 
to the East was particularly problematic for the European identity. Conflicts and contradictions 
surged among politicians on the inclusivity character of the European identity. For some, the 
enlargement to the East after the fall of the Soviet Union would have threatened a common 
identity since a too large of a Europe could have failed to find an identity. As authors Toplak and 
Šumi says: “So while some politicians called for recognition of importance of European identity 
as a future political project, others already mourned it in the light of a too large Europe. Clearly, 
political conceptions of what (European) identity was were far from consensual.”21 For example, 
the entry of Turkey into the EU has always been a very difficult topic, due to the European 
attitude toward the Islamic world. A controversial speech was made by Franco Frattini, ex EU 
Commissioner, in which religion and Christianity are seen as essential aspects of the identity as 
in contrast to other religions such as Islam: “On one hand, we quite rightly recognize the 
influence that religious characteristics have on other people’s identities, like Muslims, but on the 
other, when we speak of our own religion, we keep our distance.”22  
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Similarly, in 2004, the President of the European Union, Hermann Von Rumpuy, 
declared that the fundamental European values derived from Christianity and that this identity 
will be threatened with the entry of an Islamic country such as Turkey. He stated: “Turkey is not 
and never will be part of Europe” (…) the universal values which are in force in Europe, and 
which are also fundamental values of Christianity, will lose vigor with the entry of a large 
Islamic country such as Turkey.”23  
  In contrast, other politicians have stressed the strong character of inclusivity of the 
European identity represented by the sharing of same values and the power of diversity. Austrian 
politician and ex-minister for Europa and international affairs Michael Spindelegger declared 
how:  “In the interest of a democratic and all aspects well-functioning Europe we must jointly 
address the complexities of identity issues in our increasingly multiethnic and multicultural 
societies. Only the collective management of diversity in legal, political, and social terms can 
lead to ownership in a democratic society and a ‘citizenship of the heart.”24  
Inclusivity can also be seen in the speech of ex-president of the Czech Republic Vaclav 
Havel who states how “Just because I’m a European, it doesn’t mean I cease to be a Czech. On 
the contrary, as a Czech, I’m also a European.”25 Finally, authors Gerard Delanty and Christ 
Rumford in their book Rethinking Europe: Social Theory and the Implications of 
Europeanization claim: “To be European is neither a matter of culture nor of politics as such. 
Instead, the condition of being European is expressed more in an orientation to the world and 
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which might be identified with the cosmopolitan spirit.”26 Therefore, being European seem to be 
part of a general spirit of cosmopolitanism diffused all around Europe, meaning they recognize 
that today we live in a world of diversity. As the authors say “to be European is not to identify 
with something called Europe or have a common identity comparable to national identity and for 
which hyphen is needed. (…) to be European is simply to recognize that one lives in a world that 
does not belong to a specific people.”27 However, Delanty and Rumford do not exclude the 
possibility that certain forms of identification can be considered as specifically European, for 
instance, the use of the Euro, education, architecture, cityscape, and more that can represent a 
certain European way of living and European society. 
The shared values as the basis for a European identity is also analyzed in a policy 
document prepared for the European Presidency of the European Union: “The Construction of 
European Identity” by Manuel Castells. He aims at advancing the construction of European 
identity, explaining why European identity is important and relevant for the European Union. He 
claims:  
Besides the economic dimension, European Union countries are now intertwined in a 
web of institutional, social and political relationships which will grow in size and 
complexity in the coming years, as new countries become associated with the EU, and as 
the European institutions extend their realm of activity. Thus, we are too far in the 
process of European integration (with considerable benefits for everybody, to this point) 
to think the unthinkable: the future breakup of the European Union. And yet, the 
European ground may be shakier than we believe.28  
 
Castells argues that the European Union is not just a political and union economy, but 
through the years the EU countries seem to be connected through deeper and more complicated 
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relationships. The economic aspect is without any doubt one of the most important elements to 
consider, but it is not enough to strengthen European identity. For instance, the global economy 
has been characterized by a series of crisis such as the Financial Crisis in 2008, the Greek Debt 
Crisis, the Migrant crisis, and more recently Covid-19 crisis which all affected more or less the 
process of European integration. Therefore, integrating Europe without a strong European 
identity can be problematic, especially during a major crisis when member states seem to turn 
into their nationalist identities. Castells illustrates identity as a set of values with a symbolic 
meaning for people belonging to a specific community that goes beyond the economic aspect of 
the EU. This set of values must have a deep meaning for most EU citizens, making it possible for 
them to feel like they belong to a common European culture under the same institutional system. 
Castells argues that European identity can not be based on religion, a common history, a 
common language, or what we usually refer to as Western values. For this reason, he identifies 
some elements of the European identity project that must have a common consensus through the 
European countries, besides the connection to political democracy. These are shared feelings in 
which citizens can agree and that can be the foundation of a European identity. The idea is to 
create a European civil society in which the development of a European identity is possible with 
a concrete policy. The main actors to create this form of identity must be the European national 
governments through the European Union; a form of European identity is possible if European 
societies reflect and engage themselves in a common project of integration.  
Inclusive nationalists and Exclusive Nationalists  
German scholar Thomas Risse elucidates how the more we tend to interact inside a social 
group in a very positive way the more we are likely to identify with this group. Citing American 




also consistent with social psychological theories of identity: the more people interact 
transnationally across borders in Europe, the more they identify with Europe.”29  
If we apply this concept to the European Union and European identity, a good example of the 
principle in action is the foundation of the Erasmus project in 1987, precisely created to diffuse a 
sense of European identity through mobility and study abroad exchange programs in European 
countries. Fligstein offers a very interesting theory according to which higher education can lead 
to a stronger European identity, following Karl W. Deutsch’s theory of integration. He claims:  
 
Deutsch’s theory helps us make sense of what has and has not happened in Europe in the 
past fifty years. A European identity is first and foremost going to arise among people 
who associate with each other across national boundaries. As European economic, social, 
and political fields develop, they cause the regular interaction of people from different 
societies. It is the people who are involved in these routine interactions who are most 
likely to come to see themselves as Europeans and as involved in a European national 
project. In essence, Europeans are going to be people who have the opportunity and 
inclination to travel to other countries and frequently interact with people in other 
societies in the Europe- wide economic, social, and political fields.30 
 
 European citizens have the opportunity to travel and interact more frequently with other people 
from different societies inside the Eurozone. Looking at data coming from the European Survey 
Studies or Eurobarometer, traveling abroad is usually connected to positive attitudes toward the 
EU. There is an article published in the Italian newspaper La Stampa interviewing Umberto Eco 
about the debt crisis in Europe and the future of Europe in general. The writer praised, among all 
the EU initiatives, the ERASMUS, underlining how it is not warring, but the culture that forges 
our identity as European. According to him, Erasmus is rarely mentioned in the business sections 
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of newspapers but “It has created the first generation of young Europeans.”31 He also argued that 
it should be mandatory and not only for students but for taxi drivers and professionals too; only 
if we spend time in other European countries, we can deepen the European identity.  
People who usually identify with Europe belong to privileged social classes, are more 
educated, and are more likely to speak several languages. This brings to the basic definition of 
exclusive nationalist vs inclusive nationalist well explained in Thomas Risse’s book A 
Community of Europeans? It has been argued that elite identities have been crucially important 
for the evolution of the European integration project. The integration project was possible thanks 
to European citizens with inclusive national identities, meaning they can identify Europe as a 
secondary identity after their primarily national identification with the member state. Europeans 
with inclusive national identities are usually defined as citizens belonging to a higher social 
class, with better higher education, more likely to travel often in other European countries, and 
more likely to speak more languages; therefore, more opened to identify themselves with other 
Europeans and Europe as a whole.  
Neil Fligstein argues how education, age, and income are essential factors for a European 
identity. If you are well educated and belong to the upper-middle classes, you are more likely to 
see a strong identification with Europe, have more positive attitudes toward immigration, and 
have more cosmopolitan values. However, a series of events, such as the Financial Crisis in 2008 
and more recently the Migration Crisis has brought a large part of citizens to associate 
exclusively with their national identities. Exclusive nationalists tend to be older, less educated, 
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less likely to travel, or speak more languages and they belong to the worker or lower classes32. 
They usually belong to right-wing political parties with a strong attachment to their nation's 
values, resulting in attitudes of hostility toward immigrants and people coming from the outside. 
This part of the population tends to perceive immigrants as a threat to one’s national culture, and 
work against a process of integration in Europe, inspiring the surge of populism and right-wing 
movements around Europe. Hence, primordial and nationalist identities together with low 
occupation levels are the main sources of Euroscepticism.  
According to Thomas Risse, we can distinguish two groups of people regarding their 
identification level with Europe:  
On the one hand, there are “the Europeans” and even a small group of “Eurostars” who 
interact transnationally, are highly educated, have high-skilled occupational levels, and 
hold mostly cosmopolitan values. This group feels very much attached to Europe and the 
EU. On the other hand, exclusive nationalists who reject Europe and the EU have less 
transnational interactions, lower education levels, and work mostly in blue-collar jobs. 
While both groups hold strong feelings—either positive or negative—about Europe and 
the EU, there is a large group in the middle who identifies with Europe as a secondary 
identity, the inclusive nationalists.33  
 
Identifying these two groups of “Europeans” it is essential to understand how citizens in Europe 
reacted to the refugee crisis.  
This literature review has produced critical concepts that I will continue to develop in 
relation to the influx of refugees to Europe. As we can see, in recent years, the question of a 
European identity has produced a lot of materials and research. However, scholars can not still 
agree on a standard definition of European identity. The majority admit that European identity is 
in the making; hence a clear definition of what it means is still ambiguous. It is a possibility that, 
if a strong European identity existed, the EU would have been able to deal with the refugee crisis 
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in a very different way. Still today, there is a strong division between the way European identity 
is conceived through political discourses and the EU's actual policies to strengthen the sense of 
belonging to a common identity. This does not exclude the fact that the EU is an unprecedented 
experiment in history; the EU can still be considered a successful project; nevertheless, more 






















3. Methodology  
In this thesis, I document and analyze as much as possible the meaning of a European identity 
and apply it to one of the biggest challenges for the EU posed by the Refugee/Migrant crisis. 
Among all the many difficulties that the EU had to face in the last few years, the 
Migrant/Refugee Crisis in Europe uniquely challenges the meaning of a European identity and 
the integration project. The refugee crisis is a perfect illustration of the limitations connected to 
the European integration project and the paradox and contradictions behind the idea of an 
inclusive form of identity in Europe. As mentioned in the literature review, Europeans shared the 
same set of values, such as respect for human rights, freedoms, religious tolerance, democracy, 
respect for diversity, and more, which makes them "Europeans". However, these values do not 
extend to refugees and migrants who are excluded continuously from the European society and 
nearly dehumanized. The Schengen agreement promotes a borderless Europe, and the same EU 
has praised them as the end of borders; however, the arrival of migrants from outside Europe 
provoked the reintroduction and reinforcement of the same boundaries. I will focus on borders 
and Fortress Europe, where the European identity is constructed and the sense of Europeanness 
is elaborated.  
Immigration policies in Europe have become more and more rigid and subject to EU 
regulations. The year 2015/ 2016 represents the peak of the crisis in Europe, with large waves of 
migrants, never seen before in the modern history of Europe, arriving in the Mediterranean. 
Countries located in the South of Europe and especially the island of Lampedusa in the 
Mediterranean have become the symbol of Fortress Europe, a term used to illustrate the EU's 
attempt to close its borders to non-EU citizens or from whoever comes from the outside. With 




member country member to another, generating chaos in the EU, incapable of keeping under 
control the number of refugees entering the country. It seems that the success of the 
Schengenland leads inevitably to Fortress Europe. 
The removal of borders inside Europe led to a stronger sense of identification between 
Europeans living in the same EU zone and, at the same time, a stronger sense of exclusion from 
whom comes from the outside. For this reason, I decided to focus on the migrant emergency in 
Europe to show the fragility and weakness of a European identity and European integration 
project which claims to be inclusive of cultural diversity. The creation of EU citizenship and 
identity created a division between "us", those inside the EU, and "them", "the other" often 
identified as the immigrants. For my refugee case study, I decided to focus on texts that analyze 
the role of borders, the Mediterranean Sea, and Fortress Europe to better represent European 
identity in relation to the migrant crisis. 
When I started researching this topic, I noticed how discussions and literature 
investigating European identity lacked clarity and coherence. Theories regarding a European 
identity seem to fall into ambiguity, without a clear definition of what this identity means and 
implies. This is particularly true if applied to the case study of the refugee crisis.  
Most of the information I have gathered for my thesis comes from academic and 
scholarly articles focused on European studies and refugee issues. The Internet has been a 
fundamental instrument, especially Google Scholar's use gave me access to a range of different 
articles focused on European identity. Together with Google Scholar, the University of San 
Francisco's library, Gleeson Library, provides me access to most articles and books throughout 




A limitation I noticed while I was researching is the lack of case studies related to the 
European identity. The majority of the resources I have found focused on the meaning and 
existence of a European identity and the different EU policies adopted through times; 
nevertheless, they do not always apply this identity concept to a specific case study. The 
Financial Crisis, the Migration Crisis, Brexit, and even Covid-19 are excellent examples of a 
European identity's fragility and inconsistency. Every time the EU is facing a crisis, there is an 
inevitable return to nationalist and sometimes extremist identities.  I did not find specific case 
studies focused on European identity applied to a particular event, except Brexit, which is 
probably the most used case study to show the inefficiency of EU integration policies.  
The way these events have threatened and put at risk a European identity is hardly explored by 
scholars, limiting themselves to mention them briefly. This is why I decided to "test" the concept 
of European identity on a specific case study.  
One of the biggest challenges was applying the concept of European identity in the 
refugee crisis context.  I decided to focus on the idea of border imperialism and fortress Europe 
to elucidate better how borders play a fundamental role in identity construction and how Europe 
has become a Fortress in which some individuals can enter, while others will inevitably clash 
with European culture. It is also important to remember that the threat to one's identity and 
culture is only a small part of the Migration Crisis. The role of media in Europe is probably one 
of the main reasons for negative attitudes toward immigrants, but this, of course, will not be part 
of my thesis, and it requires a thesis of its own.  
Other critical primary resources used in my thesis are official legal documents issued by 
the European Parliament. The Treaty of Rome and the Treaty of Paris have some legal 




in the '70s. From then on, it will be considered a priority for the EC agenda. For instance, in 
1973, the “Declaration on European Identity” drafted in the Copenhagen European Summit 
introduced the importance of cooperation among the Nine-member states to face global threats. 
The Maastricht Treaty in 1993 is another crucial document to understand better the European 
identity and the concept of European citizenship. Together with treaties, speeches made by 
influential political figures on European identity issues helped me better understand how they 
perceive the integration process.  
The European Union's official website, Europa.eu, is essential to find a wide range of 
official documents, publications, data, statistics, policy reviews, and more. It is possible to find 
the necessary information on how the EU works, its goals, strategies, latest news, and links to 
other websites. In addition to that, the official website of the research and studies center on 
Europe, Foundation Robert Schuman, gives access to information on European issues and the 
meaning of European identity. It is the reference research center developing studies on the 
European Union, specifically constructed to promote the construction of Europe and its policies 
promoting its goals everywhere around Europe. It contains beneficial research papers, 
publications and it organizes conferences on critical European issues.  
Also, I use data and surveys from Eurobarometer to illustrate better the attitudes of 
European toward refugees and their sense of belonging to the same identity. Established in 1974, 
Eurobarometer is the official European Commission survey system and contains immense 
resources with interviews and surveys made in every EU country on different topics. It 
investigates the feelings and reactions of specific social groups selected to analyze a particular 




offer insights into the European Union's migratory situation and the challenges represented by 
border management and security.   
Finally, I am originally from Italy, and back in 2015, I was about to start my first 
semester as an undergraduate student. At that time, the refugee crisis was at its peak, and it was 
bombarding every Italian newspaper or tv channel. In my contemporary history class, we often 
discussed the problems of integration and the threat people felt to their own culture and identity. 
The Mediterranean Sea and the Island of Lampedusa became the symbol of the crisis and 
Fortress Europe, and being geographically close to it, made me interested in this topic in the first 
place. Consequently, some of the information used directly comes from my undergraduate 




























4. Case Study: Refugee Crisis in Europe  
 
4.1 Background  
 
This thesis uses the current refugee and migrant crisis as an illustrative example to show 
the challenges the EU faces regarding its integration project and European identity construction.  
The EU is constantly confronted with the obstacle of finding a coherent political, cultural, and 
social identity; however, the crisis has shown its fragility and substantial lack of solidarity when 
it was needed. But if European identity is still not well defined, how can the refugees' crisis 
threaten European culture? 
Author Biedenkopf and his co-authors in the book What holds Europe Together? ask:  
What is European culture? What is Europe? These are questions that must be constantly 
posed anew. So long as Europe is of the present, and not simply the past, they can never 
be conclusively answered. Europe's identity is something that must be negotiated by its 
peoples and institutions. Europeans can and must adapt themselves and their institutions, 
so that European values, traditions, and conceptions of life can live on and be effective. 
At the same time, the Union and its citizens must make their values endure as a basis of a 
common identity through ever-changing conditions.34 
 
The authors explain that the meaning of being European must be constantly negotiated because 
conditions are always changing in Europe. The cohesion of the EU is possible only through the 
solidarity of member states. As we said before, the meaning of identity is complicated and 
ambiguous, implying a component of sameness and distinctiveness at the same time. Collective 
identities are not stable, fixed, and unique as nationalists often presuppose, but they are subjected 
to change from external circumstances. Authors Wodak and Boukala state in their “European 
Identities and the Revival of nationalism in the European Union: “A European identity defined as 
a collective identity unifies the members of the European Union or the residents of Europe and 
 






excludes the 'Others', those outside of Europe's boundaries.”35 Consequently, we can conclude 
that there is a component of inclusiveness and exclusiveness in the same European identity 
concept that the refugee crisis magnifies. Those coming from outside Europe are identified as 
"the other" who paradoxically make European identity stronger since identifying the other is 
almost necessary for identity construction processes. At the same time, a crisis such as the 
migrant one led to the rise of EU skeptic political ideologies expressed by far-right parties. There 
has been the adoption of strict immigration measures against outsiders. The rhetoric of exclusion 
has become part of the discourse on European identity and European culture since clear 
boundaries between "us" and "them" must be defined.  
The refugee crisis in 2015/2016 tested the EU's solidarity to deal with a situation of these 
dimensions and the existence of a common European identity, showing its fragility and paradox 
at the same time. Tensions in everyday life started to surge in Europeans lives with the arrival of 
masses of non-European immigrants. The sudden appearance of asylum seekers and refugees 
from Arab and African countries, Muslim or non-Muslim, generated panic and confusion in the 
European governments and populations. In 2015 and 2016, according to Eurostat, more than 1.2 
million refugees seek asylum in the EU, nearly as twice more than in previous years, and media 
and politicians labeled the problem as the Refugee/Migrant Crisis.36                                             
This situation was unprecedented in the history of modern Europe. Brexit is often 
regarded as a direct consequence of migration in Europe. European policies such as the 
Schengen Agreement that provides for freedom of movement between member states started to 
collapse, and reveal their inefficiencies were revealed during the crisis. European diplomats were   
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caught by surprise, struggling to manage compassion, balance, and support for people who chose 
exile for economic, security, and personal reasons. At the same time, the EU was unable to 
develop a common migration policy that could work for all member countries. 
It is essential to mention that all EU member states have signed the 1951 Geneva 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. Still, in practice, their commitment to it has been 
partial and not always visible. Some national governments have tried to avoid their legal 
obligations in processing applications for asylum. Other states acted with the mass deportation of 
refugees and asylum seekers without considering their claims first, violating the Convention's 
rules. The UK, for instance, introduced tough policies to isolate and marginalize the refugee 
community who already entered Europe. The problem lies in the fact that European immigration 
policy is full of contradictions and paradoxes, and the tragic consequence is the loss of human 
lives. Since 1988, more than 16,000 migrants have died in an attempt to reach the Mediterranean. 
The majority drowned at sea, and others committed suicide in detention centers when their 
asylum application was rejected. Female migrants trying to reach Europe have frequently been 
victims of rape and sexual violence from other migrants or the same police. Refugees have been 
found themselves in perennial incertitude or limbo, unable to become part of European society.  
Between 2015 and 2016, member states agreed on a series of measures to share 
responsibility for the refugees who already were on European soil and manage possible future 
flows. The EU spent several billion euros to create a common asylum and migration policy 
trying to support member states in accommodating migrants and refugees. Referring to the 
budget and the EU funding on migration inside the Union in 2014-202037, the two main funding 
 






tools are considered the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) and the Borders and 
Visa strand of the Internal Security Fund (ISF). According to the EU parliament resources, 
AMIF has a budget of €6.89 billion and ISF Borders and Visa of €2.76 billion making the total 
budget of €9.65 billion. The Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) is involved in 
national and EU actions to promote and manage in an efficient way the arrival of migrants with 
the development of a common approach to migration. AMIF funds initiatives aiming at support 
member states for the integration of migrants. Due to the crisis in 2015 and 2016, the initial 
budget of €3.14 billion was increased to €6.89 billion at the end of the year 2017. 78% of the 
AMIF resources were distributed to member states in order to adopt multi-year national 
programs. The remaining funds are used to support other actions of interest for the EU, 
transnational actions, emergency assistance or the European Migration Network. The Internal 
Security Fund Borders and Visa (ISF) has the main objective of contributing to the level of 
security in the European Union, promoting a strict control and protection of external borders and 
issuing of Schengen visas. It serves as a way to detect illegal immigration through borders and 
visas. Its budget ranges among €3.89 billion for the years 2014-2020, and it is used for specific 
Frontex equipment, coordination, cooperation and administration. 65% of the resources are used 
for shared management among the member states. All members participated in the increase and 
improvement of ISF borders and Visa instruments, with the exceptions of Ireland and the United 
Kingdom. Once again, the emergency represented by the migration crisis pushed for a large 
increase of the initial budget. Both the ISF and AMIF belong to the area of home affairs which 
includes another six decentralized agencies with resources of €2.13 billion, later increased to 




additional resources making the total amount to respond to the crisis and the external borders 
control more than €20 billion.  
Another budget tool that is being used in response to the migration crisis in Europe is the 
EU Trust Funds: the Madad Trust Fund and the Emergency Trust Fund for Africa. The Madad 
Trust Fund was a response to the Syrian crisis and provides aid for Syria’s neighbouring 
countries. It is a fund created to help refugees and their host communities with the largest part of 
the fund financing actions in Turkey. The Emergency Trust Fund for Africa was created to 
address irregular immigration and displaced people in Africa, with the main objective of 
encouraging people to stay in their countries instead of embarking in the Mediterranean to reach 
Europe. It is important to remember that the majority of these funds come from the EU budget 
and rarely from contributions from each member state.  
In 2020, while the member states in the EU were also facing the threat represented by 
Covid-19 crisis, they decided the priorities for the Union for the next years by agreeing to a 
massive recovery fund for the damages represented by the pandemic to the EU’s economy. In the 
month of July 2020, there has been four intense days of negotiations for the EU in which the 
leaders agreed in a new Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) and Recovery Fund. The MFF 
is the European Union’s budget that usually covers 7 years. In a few words, the EU migration 
policy was only a small part of the budget representing 0.93% for the MFF 2014-2020.38 
Considering the next 7 years, 2021-2027, the Commission decided to increase the resources and 
the budget to support migration and borders policies; in particular the budget would have 
increased from €10 billion for the years 2014-2020 to €31 billion for the next seven years, 2021-
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2027, nearly three times more than the previous one. The main goal is to strengthen border 
control, Frontex and to develop a common and standard agreement on immigration. As we can 
see, sharing responsibilities among member states remain one of the priorities of the new 
framework.  
Despite trying to achieve a common policy on refugees, some countries ended up taking 
in more refugees. Some countries were more welcoming toward refugees and migrants than 
others; for instance, Germany and Sweden are often considered the most welcoming member 
states. More specifically, Germany became, since 2012, the number one destination country for 
asylum seekers in Europe with 442,000 applications just in the year 201539. Sweden has around 
1,600 applicants for every 100,000 people, receiving more refugees per capita than any other EU 
country in 2015. These numbers are huge if compared to France with only 110 applicants per 
100,000 people and the UK with 60 asylum seekers per 100,000 people in 2015.  Sweden and 
Germany have been often referred to as the most refugee-friendly countries in Europe overall. 
These countries tend to have a strong inclusive culture with a more liberal asylum regime. The 
importance of respecting the Schengen cooperation and giving an overall idea of solidarity in the 
EU may be what pushed some countries to take a different and more welcoming position, while 
other member countries have resisted accepting refugees. 
The two main routes to arrive in Europe are from Turkey to the Greek islands and from 
North Africa to the Italian island of Lampedusa in Sicily. Italy and Greece became the “hot 
spots” for migrants arrivals, and they are considered entry or arrival countries where asylum 
seekers came first. The majority of refugees arriving in southern Europe had the precise 
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objective of reaching countries located in northern Europe such as Germany, Sweden, Denmark, 
and the Netherlands, considered a better option for economic opportunities and quality of life. 
However, even if Italy and Greece were not the final destination for the majority of refugees, 
they were the main point of entry with about 850,000 arrivals in Greece and 153,842 in Italy 
only in 2015. Most of the administrative and legal responsibilities were put in Greece’s and 
Italy's hands, who were overwhelmed by the system and incapable of dealing with asylum 
seekers' numbers. Following the Dublin Convention, these countries located in the 
Mediterranean had the whole responsibility for considering each refugee’s and determining 
whether they were eligible for resettlement or whether they would be repatriated.  
As Frontex's report in 2015 states:  
As the vast majority of migrants arrive undocumented, screening activities are essential 
to properly verify their declaration of nationality. False declarations of nationality are 
common among nationals who are unlikely to obtain asylum in the EU or who are liable 
to be returned to their country of origin or transit, or who perceive an advantage in 
speeding up their journey. With large numbers of arrivals remaining essentially doubtful 
for a variety of reasons, false identification documents, no identification documents, 
concerns over the validity of claimed nationality, etc., and with no thorough check nor 
any penalty for those making such false declarations, there is a risk that some persons 
representing a security threat for the EU will take advantage of this situation.40  
 
Consequently, Greece’s and Italy's registration process are of fundamental importance for the 
security of Europe. Nevertheless, the failure to register and process single cases both in Greece 
and Italy is already a signal of a fragile support system.  
The situation pushed the German government to negotiate an agreement with Tukey in 
2016, a desperate attempt to control the number of refugees and migrants from Turkey to the 
Greek islands. It was intended to discourage refugees arriving in Europe. In exchange, the EU 
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agreed to resettle one Syrian refugee from Turkey for each person who was returned to their 
facilities. The agreement was primarily meant to help Greece; however, when the number of 
refugees crossing Turkey to arrive in Greece decreased, the number of refugees arriving in Italy 
doubled with the EU-Turkey agreement's approval. In fact, at the beginning of 2016, Italy 
received more than 90,000 migrants and, according to the UNHCR more than 2,500 people lost 
their lives in the Mediterranean between January and May 201641. At the end of the year 2016, 
Italy received a total of 181,436 sea arrivals with an estimated 4,578 people who died or went 
missing.  
European migration policies were intended to manage and control the chaos inside the 
continent; however, their exclusionary character did little to challenge the rise of nationalism and 
populism in member countries. Protests and acts of racism increased all around Europe, with 
fascist resurgences undermining the democracy of European governments. From one side, 
migrants were recognized as a vital part of the job market and economy; from the other side, the 
governments contributed to the model of fortress Europe by supporting increased border 
enforcement. 
The situation has also been labeled as “the Schengen crisis” since The Schengen 
Agreement, which abolished internal borders in order to allow free mobility between member 
states in the EU, became a problem for the first time. Mobility among member states is 
considered a privilege for European citizens and a way to increase a sense of European 
belonging due to citizens’ constant interaction from different countries. Nevertheless, the lack of 
 







barriers became a problem in the context of the refugee crisis and the reintroduction or, at least, a 
clear delineation of boundaries became once again necessary.  
The Schengen cooperation started back in 1985, establishing freedom and free mobility 
of goods, services, capital, and people inside the European community. In 1997 with the Treaty 
of Amsterdam, the Schengen cooperation became part of the EU project of integration. Only in 
the future would it reveal its fragility with the incapability of managing immigrants and refugees 
moving from one member state to another. Most importantly, the Schengen area includes 
countries with very different legal structures, such as Switzerland or Norway, that are not 
officially in the EU, making it harder to adhere to EU migration policies. The refugee crisis has 
demonstrated Schengen’s inner fragilities, showing huge differences between states participating 
in the agreement. The biggest paradox represented by the refugee crisis is probably the need to 
contain immigrants from one side and the necessity to maintain a borderless territory to respect 
the values of free mobility from another side.  
4.2 Euroscepticism and Rise of Populism  
As mentioned in the literature review, Thomas Risse's distinction between inclusive 
identity and exclusive national identity in his book A Community of Europeans? can provide 
assistance in understanding citizen's responses to the refugee crisis in Europe and the consequent 
rise of populism in the EU.  Inclusive nationalists are those who identify both with their nation-
state and Europe, supporting the European integration project; exclusive nationalists on the other 
side see their national identity as the only possible identification.  Exclusive nationalists, 
however, are more likely to be Eurosceptic and xenophobic since other types of identities, such 
as the European one, are excluded. Factors like age, education, income, and social class are 




from an upper or middle class have higher chances of connecting to Europe and European 
identity. It has often been said how European elites founded the European project since they 
benefit from integration. They are more likely to speak more languages, travel around the world 
and in Europe, and have more knowledge about the EU institutions. Having more cosmopolitan 
values could also mean positive attitudes toward immigrants and refugees arriving in Europe.  
American sociologist Neil Fligstein sustains that higher education and constant 
interaction among people can lead to a more potent form of European identity:  
Deutsch's theory helps us make sense of what has and has not happened in Europe in the 
past fifty years. A European identity is first and foremost going to arise among people 
who associate with each other across national boundaries. As European economic, social, 
and political fields develop, they cause the regular interaction of people from different 
societies. It is the people who are involved in these routine interactions who are most 
likely to come to see themselves as Europeans and as involved in a European national 
project. In essence, Europeans are going to be people who have the opportunity and 
inclination to travel to other countries and frequently interact with people in other 
societies in the Europe- wide economic, social, and political fields.42  
 
Traveling abroad is generally considered a fundamental element connected to positive attitudes 
with the EU. The more people travel, the more they seem to identify with Europe as a whole. An 
interaction that could be seen from the migration point of view, in which foreigners' arrival is not 
seen as a possible threat to one's culture and identity. An example to illustrate this concept is 
represented by Erasmus Programme which has become one of the symbols of the construction of 
European identity. It was specifically created in 1987 with the main objective of consolidating a 
common identity among students who have the opportunity to study and live in another 
European country for a certain time, creating the so-called Erasmus Citizen or Erasmus 
Generation.  
 





On the other hand, exclusive nationalists tend to be older and less educated. They usually 
hold very hostile attitudes toward immigrants and refugees or foreigners in general, and 
everything that comes from the outside is perceived as a threat to their national culture.  
According to Risse, primordial and strong national identities go together with low skilled jobs 
and low education levels, and they are a powerful source of Euroscepticism and xenophobia.  
One example to consider is Brexit. Many case studies found out that Brexit voters were more 
likely to have lower levels of education. Researchers from the University of Leicester sustained 
that if more people in the UK went to university, the outcome of the vote would have been 
different. They sustained that access to higher education has been fundamental in determining 
how people voted43. Age and gender were other important factors, but not as significant as 
education level. The result was that university educated British people voted to stay in the EU 
and had a better knowledge of the EU institutions.  
 Exclusive nationalists are more likely to hold negative views toward migrants coming to 
the EU and more likely to belong to Eurosceptic political parties. The chaos and confusion the 
crisis created facilitated the rise of Eurosceptical populist parties and movements that were able 
to mobilize a large part of the population. Eurosceptic parties did not develop sentiments against 
the EU and migration; but they took advantage of the present situation to mobilize attitudes and 
feelings already existing among the minority of Europeans.44 An example is the Front National 
of Jean-Marie Le Pen, one of the most extremist right-wing party in Europe, containing anti-
Semitic and other racist elements. The party has assumed in the last years very strong anti-
immigration, Islamophobic positions and a sense of strong protection of French people and 
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French economy against the rest of the world and the same EU. The party has expressed several 
times its position against the role of the EU, claiming a strong French nationalism, and gaining 
support from the working class and the unemployed. In Austria, the revival of nationalist 
tendencies is represented by Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ), founded back in 1955. It 
represents a form of right-wing populist extremism, anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim. If it is true 
that this party has existed for a long time, the crucial years for the immigration crisis, such as 
2016, provoked a sharp rise of its popularity with the promotion of anti-EU and anti-immigrant 
policies. At the same time, the Alternative for Germany (AfD) won 12.6 % in 2017 upsetting the 
political system in Germany and, in the same year, politician Andrej Babis, strongly anti-
immigration, became Czech Republic’s Prime Minister.45 Particularly in Germany, the decision 
of Angela Merkel to accept more refugees from Syria than other EU countries provoked a crisis 
in Germany and the rapid rise of AfD.  
Another perfect example of the rise of populism in Europe is represented by far-right 
Lega Nord in Italy. Its leader, Matteo Salvini, was able to obtain nearly 17% of the vote in 
national elections back in 2018, exceeding the expectations and rising concern about a new 
possible form of fascism in Italy. Salvini gained most of his support from the norther regions of 
Italy such as Lombardy, Piedmont and Veneto, with a new form of populism in Italy that was 
able to capture the attention of a huge number of voters. Historically, La Lega Nord was founded 
with the precise objective of giving more independence to Italy’s norther regions, creating a 
strong division between South and North. Nevertheless, with the refugees and Euro crisis, 
Salvini directed his ideas toward a sharp criticism of the EU institutions and of the Euro in 
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general, defining the use of Euro as a “Crime against humanity”46 and asking for an exit of Italy 
from the EU. With the refugee crisis in 2015, the League took advantage of the anger of Italians 
toward the large number of migrants arriving in the Mediterranean to focus its ideologies against 
the arrival of refugees and immigrants in Italy. Salvini became a champion in developing harsh 
migration rules, trying to stop migrant ship for touching the Italian soil. At the very beginning of 
2020, he was accused of abusing power while Minister of Interior when, back in 2019, he 
prevented and blocked a migrant ship from arriving in Lampedusa. He refused to let 100 
migrants land in Italy, leaving them at sea and in terrible conditions, violating international 
conventions on refugees’ rights. Italy’s senate has voted recently to put Salvini on trial for 
holding migrants at sea, possible facing at least 15 years in prison.47  
If it is true that right-wing extremist parties have always existed in Europe, migration 
contributed hugely to the fortification of populism in Europe. If we look at the agenda of the 
majority of populist parties, the immigration and refugee issues represent their top priority, used 
to exploit fear of terrorism and cultural threats. The increased support for the populist right 
provoked a sharp decline for the center-left and moderate parties, while center-right parties felt 
the need to shift toward a populist rhetoric in order to gain support and popularity. An example is 
Silvio Berlusconi, leader of Forza Italia who never really had strong attitudes toward refugees 
and immigrants but decided to deport more than 600,000 refugees who has arrived in Italy since 
2015.48 
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It is interesting to notice how discourses around preserving a European culture were used 
against the same EU as incapable of unity and solidarity. There was a process of politicizing49 
the migrant and refugee crisis from these political parties, especially from the identity point of 
view. Their debates focused on the main difference between them vs. us, or inside vs. outside. 
They promoted an idea of fortress Europe that must preserve its purity together with the 
importance of nationalism and national history and culture, which is threatened. The French 
Front National, the German AfD, the Polish PiS, and the Italian La Lega Nord are examples of 
nationalistic, right-wing populist parties supporting countries leaving the EU from one side and 
the exclusion of refugees and migrants in Europe from the other. Not all nationalist parties in 
Europe supported an exit from the EU, but the majority was clearly against refugees' arrival and 
welcoming on their soil. Their political discourses were able to cause insecurity among citizens 
who felt threatened by foreigners, complaining about mobilizing more robust security measures. 
There is the formation of a “Myth of Invasion”,50 to use the term taken from Hein De Haas’s 
essay on “The Myth of Invasion: the inconvenient realities of Africa migration to Europe”. Even 
if the essay was published years before the migration crisis in 2015, the term is very useful to 
understand how far-right political parties are exploiting the idea of an invasion coming from 
African or Middle Easter countries which can possibly threaten their culture and heritage. More 
specifically, the role of media is fundamental in creating sensational images, giving the idea of 
waves of migrants trying desperately to reach Europe. Images of extreme poverty, violence, 
degradation are common in the media to exploit typical stereotypes of violent or poor migrants.  
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Politicians and leaders are the one using terms such as “invasion” which arouse feelings of fear 
among citizens. If there is also, from one side, the political and economic aspect that migrants 
could steal jobs from Europeans, the depiction of an invasion of migrants that could put in 
danger European identity seem to be the most powerful.  
These political parties were asking for severe restrictions of refugees in Europe, 
lamenting the fact that Europe was receiving too many refugees, going against an idea of a 
multicultural Europe. They were extremely successful in spreading anti-immigration sentiments 
all around Europe, creating further chaos in the EU. 
4.3 European Identity in crisis?  
In September 2016, the European Commission president, Jean Claude Junker, addressed 
the European parliament with a plan for uniting Europe, stating that the EU faces an existential 
and unprecedented crisis.51 Two main events brought him to define the crisis as existential; the 
first event is the UK leaving the EU in 2016, known as the Brexit effect. The second is the 
migrant/refugee crisis, expressing the necessity to control and manage the vast numbers of 
migrants arriving from Africa and the Middle East. The two events are more connected to each 
other than it might happen since the incapability of managing the refugee crisis is often 
considered as one of the main reasons for the UK to leave the EU.  
At the time, border control and terrorism were the centers of attention, and Europeans 
asked for more assurance and stability from the EU. In fact, the construction of linkages 
connecting migrants and refugees to terrorist activities is part of the construction of migration as 
a threat, frequently abused my media. The EU's incapability of assuring peace and security in the 
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territory provoked a crisis in its citizens' identity and a decreased satisfaction with the EU. 
Immigration flows were followed by the closing of borders and the building up of walls leading 
to violence and abuse of human rights. Author Michalis Bartsidis in his essay focused on the 
work of the French philosopher Balibar “European Paradoxes of Humanness: Discussing Etienne 
Balibar's work on Europe"; uses the term "internal exclusion" or "internal closure"52 to describe 
how European governments' politics aim at excluding diversities. As soon as refugees cross the 
European borders, they are confined in deportation centers where they are frequently under 
surveillance or stocked in a situation of perennial uncertainty. According to Balibar, there is a 
paradoxical scheme of exclusion and inclusion in which foreigners are welcomed in the country 
to be later considered outsiders or aliens by the society.  
The phenomenon of migration in Europe increased the fear of being exposed to 
economic, social, political regression and violent attacks. Looking at the Eurobarometer 84 of 
Autumn 2015, a significant percentage of citizens expressed their concerns toward the EU 
institutions with a rise in the numbers of people who do not trust the EU.53 Optimism about the 
EU's future has been grown since 2013, but in 2015 it decreased with pessimism exceeding 40% 
for the first time since 2013. Looking at the second section of Standard Eurobarometer 84 about 
Europeans' main concerns, we can see how immigration is considered the most critical problem 
the EU faces. Right after immigration, citizens point out terrorism and the lack of protection and 
safety in the EU as the second main issue. The polls show immigration as the primary concern on 
a national level, not only on a European one.  
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On another section focused on negative and positive feelings toward immigration; it is 
interesting to notice how most Europeans have positive feelings toward immigration of people 
from other EU member states. However, immigration coming from outside the EU, from non-
Europeans, evoke perceptions of fear and terrorism. As the results show:  
Majorities of the population have a negative feeling about immigration of people from 
outside the EU in 25 countries (up from 23 in spring 2015), in particular in Slovakia 
(86%), Latvia (86%), Hungary (82%), the Czech Republic (81%) and Estonia (81%). 
Conversely, majorities of the population take a positive view of the immigration of 
people from outside the EU in Sweden (70%), Spain (53%) and Ireland (49%). (…) 
Compared with spring 2015, negative views have gained ground in 18 countries, most 
notably in Romania (54%, +20 percentage points) and Slovenia (76%, +19).54  
 
Not only Europeans perceived in a negative way immigration from outside Europe, but these 
feelings have increased in several countries if compared to the same analysis done in Spring 
2015.  
When asked about measures to fight illegal immigration, nine Europeans out of ten say 
that the EU needs more decisive steps to fight illegal immigration coming from outside Europe, 
and these actions should involve the EU on a national level. More than two-thirds of Europeans 
say they favor a common European policy on migration; however, the results also show how the 
respondents have changed their minds since Spring 2015 and are unsure about the possibility of 
finding a joint agreement on migration.  
As we can see from the Eurobarometer results, the public perception is that the EU was 
unprepared to handle the enormous waves of populations entering the territory. Moreover, the 
phenomenon of migration was later accompanied by a series of terrorist attacks in European's 
cities for which migration is often unjustly blamed for. A direct consequence of these two 
dynamics was the feeling of frustration and fear regarding the preservation of European identity 
 




that seems to be threatened by the massive influx of immigrants who arrived on European soil. 
As author Ana-Maria Bolborici says in her “The Immigration Crisis-Reflections concerning the 
crisis of European Identity”: “The core of the refugee issue is that we are facing within the 
European Union an identity crisis.”55An identity that was put into question for the first time with 
the arrival of the others.  
It is also vital to remember that the refugee crisis added up to a series of events happened 
in previous years, such as the Financial Crisis in 2008 and the Greek Debt Crisis, overwhelming 
the already fragile European integration project and a sense of a common identity. These crises 
can be overcome only through a profound question and analysis of the meaning of European 
identity. Who are the Europeans? and what is European identity? As specified in my literature 
review, there is an ambiguity and vagueness toward the meaning of European identity with no 
clear answers. Nevertheless, a European identity can be considered the set of shared values with 
which citizens can identify. Still, values such as democracy, respect for human rights, religious 
tolerance, and solidarity, defined as “European” seem to be lost in the time of crises, with a 
return to individual nationalism.  
The refugee crisis has forced the EU to admit its weakness and fragilities inside the 
European integration process. It seems to have threatened Europe's sense of self and its own deep 
identity, with the question of who is European and who is not. The crisis brought a series of 
reactions around Europe, specifically the protection of national and supranational territory and 
the need to protect European people from non-European.  
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The study elaborated by Jérôme Fourquet for the Fondation Jean Jaurès56 considers the 
European reactions to the migrant crisis analyzing more specifically seven European countries: 
France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Denmark and the UK with about 1000 people 
for each country. The results have shown how the majority of European public opinion agree on 
the importance of assisting Mediterranean countries located in the south in order to keep people 
there. Countries agreed on the support of these countries to assist properly refugees; with the 
only exception of France in which the top option, 30% of the votes, was the creation of stronger 
and strict borders to fight illegal immigration. Another observation that can be made is how the 
majority of Europeans consider a long-term solution as the most useful and effective for the 
migration problem, consequently a large part of the population sees the problem as continuing in 
the future and not temporary.  
In the section dedicated to the support and acceptance of migrants, we can see a picture 
of Europe deeply divided. When asked about how migrants should be distributed in Europe, EU 
countries do not offer a cohesive response. Germany is the number one destination for refugees, 
while Italy and Greece are the main entry for refugees in Europe with a higher level of support 
for accepting immigrants in their countries and distributing them equally in the other EU 
countries. 86% of Germans and 69% of Italians consider their country as the one accepting more 
migrants compared to other EU countries. On the other side, we have countries that are not so 
favorable in accepting migrants, such as the UK with 44%, the Netherlands with 48%, and 
France with 46% people in favor of welcoming refugees. This also explains why a joint 
agreement among EU member states with an equal distribution of refugees in the countries has 
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been particularly hard. Each member states' reactions intensely depend on the political leaders 
and parties able to influence most of the population. For instance, this study was published in 
2015, which is the beginning of the refugee crisis; later countries such as Italy will adopt more 
nationalist measures toward the arrival of migrants with the rise of the far-right parties and, 
consequently, fewer people in favor of accepting migrants. According to the study, the 
publication of pictures of a Syrian boy, the so-called "Aylan effect" helped increase the support 
in accepting migrants among the European population. In September 2015, the image of the dead 
body of a three years old refugee, Aylan Kurdi, started to circulate in the news and newspaper, 
arousing a series of strong emotions, empathy, and compassion among the public and focusing 
the attention on the humanitarian crisis in Syria. Different studies have shown how a single 
image was able to mobilize a series of donations and campaigns for Syrian refugees. Similarly, 
this study shows how the Aylan effect was more felt in some countries than others and how there 
was a shift in public opinion. 
There is a division among Europeans on the acceptance of migrants in their own 
countries; however, there is a common consensus on the risk that migration may represent. For 
instance, 70% and 80% of participants agree that accepting a large portion of migrants may result 
in many people from Africa or the Middle East moving to Europe. Another biggest fear among 
citizens is represented by terrorism; 64% and 85%, respectively, in Germany and the 
Netherlands, think that among the masses of refugees coming here, there are terrorists. The 
majority of countries seem to agree on possible linkages between terrorists and migrants, not 
only countries directly affected by terrorism in 2015, but also other countries in which terrorist 
attacks did not happen. The anxiety toward terrorism remains one of the biggest worries for EU 




among Europeans. Despite the widespread perceptions of anxiety among nations, the study also 
shows how a significant part of Europeans believe in welcoming migrants. Solidarity is present 
in countries that already offered a more substantial acceptance of migrants, such as Germany, 
Italy, and even Spain, with less favorable people in France and the UK.  
Another interesting section of the study worth mentioning is dedicated to the main idea 
that migrants are, in fact, economic migrants and not asylum seekers, which national populist 
parties and their supporters sustain. The same nationalists often believe or create the idea that 
their own country is accepting more migrants than others. For instance, Spain and Denmark take 
a deficient number of asylum seekers. However, a significant part of the population believes that 
they accept more migrants than other countries in the EU. Studies similar to this one helps us 
understand the divided opinions; more specifically, these deep divisions and lack of agreement 
between member states are what brought to define this crisis as an existential one.   
The paradox and contradiction inside the idea of a European identity is its element of 
inclusiveness and exclusiveness.  Europe praises itself for its cultural inclusiveness, but this has 
not been the case for immigrants and non-Europeans. There is the need for multiculturalism, 
acceptance of other cultures from those inside the boundaries and borders; from another side, 
there is the necessity to act according to the Westphalian conception of sovereignty toward 
people coming from outside the borders. Since the European identity is founded on principles of 
inclusion of different cultures, the rejection and exclusion of immigrants fall into contradiction.  
 4.4 Borderland Europe  
The question of borders, both figurately or physically, is essential when we talk about 
identity, European citizenship, or Europeanness in general. The sociology behind the role and 




contrast to a European identity. The role of borders in Europe can help to understand better how 
the European integration project was conceived and elaborated since they are the place where the 
idea of Europeanness or Whiteness is elaborated, constructing a specific political space.  
The Schengen Agreement, signed in 1985, is the treaty that led most of the European 
countries to abolish their national borders to create a Europe without borders, the so-called 
Schengen Area. The Agreement is of historical importance because it ended border control 
among member states. The concept of free movement among European states is very ambitious, 
and it was conceived in the past, since the Middle Ages. After World War 2, the idea became 
more concrete and decisive. However, the concept of free borders created concerns and doubts 
among member states; there was a part supporting the idea of free Europe with no internal border 
checks, but another part was strongly against it, considering it as a threat to national borders. In 
May 1999, with the Treaty of Amsterdam, the Schengen Agreement was included in the legal 
structure of the European Union.  
External and internal borders of Europe have become more and more critical with the 
migration crisis in which there is a need to define what is Europe and what is not. The new 
external borders are much more porous and less stable; the case of Brexit represents how 
countries in the EU can be confined inside the boundary, and they can become irrelevant right 
after. Author Francesca Romana Ammaturo says: “In this scenario, the abstract concept of the 
'European border' becomes one of the fetishes of identity,' a fictitiously real reminder of the 
importance of insulated belonging against the contaminating effect of migration and 
transnational flows of individuals”57  
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Borders are central in our discussion because they enable the creation of European 
identity and European citizenship; they produce knowledge and information regarding Europe 
and the other's conceptualization, the migrant. French philosopher Etienne Balibar uses the 
expression “Borderland”58 to describe the situation in Europe, meaning a continent where 
borders are displaced from their original places and placed under other rules. The author 
questions the possibility of a new model of inclusion in Europe able to consider the complexities, 
political and ethnic, present in the territory. He is looking for a way to eradicate exclusions, 
inequalities, and differences between citizens and non-citizens. Can Europe establish a real 
political integration?  
Balibar discusses the meaning of European identity and the creation of European 
citizenship strictly connected to territory. He proposes borders as places of integration of 
individuals instead of isolation. The others do not become excluded, but they become integrated 
with differences. Europe is a borderland because there are numerous borders all over the 
territory; however, Europe can be transformed into an example of integration. According to him: 
“Borderland is the name of the place where the opposites flow into one another, where `strangers' 
can be at the same time stigmatized and indiscernible from `ourselves', where the notion of 
citizenship, involving at the same time community and universality, once again confronts its 
intrinsic antinomies.”59 Borders in the EU have been deprived of their central significance and 
political/geographical meaning, becoming devices for constructing narratives around 
Europeanness's idea.  
 
58 Balibar, Etienne. "Europe as borderland." Environment and planning D: Society and space 27, no. 2 (2009): 190-
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Balibar’s “Europe as Borderland” is fundamental to illustrate the role of borders in 
Europe and the meaning of political space. The space of borders represents the relationship that 
exists between an identity or citizenship and a European nation-state. The image of political 
space is a potent one. The author cites another influential author, Carlo Galli, to describe the 
relationship between political power and the control of borders and territorial space in general. 
Reporting Galli's words, the author says how:  
Globalization requires a convenient political space, which is not itself global, in order to 
fully develop its dynamic potential. To put it shortly, if one wants to avoid at the same 
time the reactionary reactions to globalization which try to preserve large or small 
communities, and the tragic nonsense of universalized alienation ... the only possible 
solution is not necessarily the dream of democratic cosmopolitanism ... . The provisory 
determinations of our space and time also suggest the European alter- native, a European 
space which would become a land of differences. Not in the sense of the old political 
geographies, however, in which Europe was seen as the hegemonic center of the World 
(the era of Jus publicum Europaeum), or [in Hegelian terms] the region where the Spirit 
becomes conscious of itself, or the borderland [between the World Camps] which is like 
a bleeding wound (the era of the Cold War). We are thinking, rather, of Europe 
recovering after its nihilistic decline... no longer fancying to bring salvation to the World, 
but `only' to build a singular political space which is not meaningless.60  
 
As we can see, the conceptualization of political space is connected to a space of power in which 
territories can create specific identities and individuals are categorized. Borders and territories 
are inextricably related to power and sovereignty, in this case, European authority.  
The EU has constructed a confederation of independent states without establishing 
specific limits and the possibility of future expansions. The member states give up part of the 
sovereignty to be subjected to some supranational identities and authorities while maintaining 
strong national sovereignty. As Balibar says: “The EU is, therefore, as much permeated or 
`invaded' by the World through its borders as it is `protected' or `isolated' by them from the rest 
of the world.”61  
 
60 Ibid, 191. 




Political spaces are consequently directly correlated to European borders. The image of 
political space is compelling to describe the deep connection between politics and territory, 
spaces and borders. As we said many times now, borders are potent instruments in the 
government's hands to oppress, exclude, and segregate people from the outside. According to 
Balibar, there are different types of conflicts happening on borders and political space, such as 
the clash of civilization, the global network, the center-periphery, and crossover conflicts62. For 
instance, the most evident conflict happening with the refugee crisis is represented by the clash 
of civilizations, meaning more specifically, religious conflicts happening at the borders. The 
Islam versus Western world/Christianity is probably the most evident conflict in which refugees' 
arrival is seen as an Islamic invasion threatening Europe's own culture and religious tradition, 
transforming borders into competition zones between different civilizations. 
Another conflict explained by the author that can be useful for the refugee case study is 
center-periphery conflict. It refers to the opposition between center and periphery elaborated by 
Immanuel Wallerstein about capitalism. Borders are a division for the North and South in which 
underdeveloped countries depend on developed countries. For Balibar, the center-periphery 
model is constantly applied to the European identity construction with Eurocentrism. Europe is 
seen as the center of the World with the concentration of powers in a single institution such as 
the EU. The periphery, in this case, is represented by countries located outside Europe, 
associated with the continent for economic reasons. The inclusion of these countries in the EU 
can somehow impede or stop Europeanization or the creation of a European identity. Turkey's 
admission to the EU is a clear example of how countries outside the center can compromise the 
 






European integration process, putting at risk a sort of political equilibrium inside the Union. The 
same goes for the refugee crisis in which migrants coming from outside Europe are seen as a 
threat to the current European cultures. There is an idea of contamination of culture, even if a 
common European civilization as we know is not pure. Europe's past and history can not be 
defined as pure because it contains different identities and cultures. Balibar states:  
It is impossible to represent Europe's history as a story of pure identities, running the 
danger of becoming progressively alienated. Its history can be represented only in terms 
of constructed identities, dependent on a series of successive encounters between 
`civilizations' (if one wants to keep the word), which keep taking place within the 
European space, enclosing populations and cultural patterns from the whole World. Just 
as it is necessary to acknowledge that in each of its `regions' Europe always remains 
heterogeneous and differs from itself as much as it differs from others (including the 
`new Europes' elsewhere in the World)……… In this sense, only a `federal' vision of 
Europe, preserving its cultural differences and solidarities, can provide a viable historical 
project for the `supranational' public sphere.63  
 
The author suggests how borders can have two different meanings; both local and global, 
separating territories categorized as foreign, reflecting a regime of power and international order:  
 
In another circumstance already reflecting on the example of the European space and its 
role in the generalization of the institution of the `border' suggested that every border has 
a double meaning, local and global: it is a `line' (more or less accepted, stable, permeable, 
visible, thick or thin) separating territories which, by virtue of its drawing, become 
`foreign'; and it is a `partition' or `distribution' of the world space, which reflects the 
regime of meaning and power under which the World is represented as a `unity' of 
different `parts'.64 
 
To illustrate better the role of borders, the author chose the topic of the EU security 
policies concerning the migrant crisis. Security policies have the precise objective of controlling 
who is entering the EU or, more generally, European soil. Security is also connected to the right 
of freedom of mobility inside the EU, making managing the refugee crisis particularly difficult. 
Liberty of circulation is among Europeans' most valuable rights in which a constant interaction 
 





between different cultures can forge a common identity. However, from another point of view, 
this mobility situation has created a violent and brutal exclusion of non-Europeans, identifying 
the migrant as the political enemy of Europe and a threat to European culture. As we mentioned 
before, borders have become the place in which different civilizations clashed and in which 
differences are elaborated, questioning the understanding of a European's identity. At the same 
time, if borders have become a place of exclusion, for Balibar, they can also be transformed into 
integration and acceptance of cultures, creating a progressive idea of multicultural and 
multiethnic Europe.     
Author Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Neilson, in their essay “Border as Method, or, the 
Multiplication of Labor” explain how borders have always been the place of violence and 
brutality since antiquity. Humans have always needed to trace a line of demarcation between 
what is considered good and evil, producing deaths of immigrants such as in the Mediterranean 
or the US-Mexico borders. They often refer to the brutality of borders as “Border War”65 since 
wars and conflicts are produced at the border, pointing out how mapping and defining borders 
was a colonial domination tool. This is why they refer to borders as a method used by the 
government and constantly challenged by the arrival of migrants. Borders are the site of 
struggles and wars to highlight the increase of deaths and accidents at sea. Security policies have 
attracted and rejected migrants at the same time, creating a situation of constant instability. It 
seems that immigrants are very much needed for the capitalist system of labor, but at the same 
time, they are constantly kept under surveillance. As we mentioned before, borders produce the 
other's concept, the foreigner who comes from outside Europe. There is the specific social 
construction of the other, necessary to secure border policies. With European identity and 
 





European citizenship, people from different member states are not considered foreigners but 
belong to the same social group. Borders then determine that whoever comes from outside this 
specific delineation is a foreigner or an alien. For this reason, author Balibar describes borders as 
absurd construction:  
The idea of a simple definition of what constitutes a border is, by definition, absurd: to 
mark out a border is precisely, to define a territory, to delimit it, and so to register the 
identity of that territory, or confer one upon it. Conversely, however, to define or identify 
in general is nothing other than to trace a border, to assign boundaries or borders (in 
Greek, horos; in Latin, finis or terminus; in German, Grenze; in French, borne). The 
theorist who attempts to define what a border is in danger of going round in circles, as the 
very representation of the border is the precondition for any definition.66 
 
Another concept Balibar introduced is the linguistic borders which have been abused by 
nation-states. Linguistic differences are another identity marker considered as the basis for 
collective identities. A common language in Europe was never possible and never enforced due 
to its rich diversity of languages in which translation from one language to another is celebrated. 
This is one reason why there should be an inclusion of migrant languages in European society. 
According to the author, Europe must eliminate some contradictions present in its construction. 
The main paradox for the author is that: “They arise from the fact that the construction of this 
supranational entity is taking place in a world where the territorial notions of `interior' and 
`exterior' are no longer completely separable, not even in a legal manner.”67  
According to Balibar: “The current difficulty, or incapacity, of Europeans (as it is expressed by 
their official politics) to accept what they (confusedly) see as `non-European' (or `anti-
European') is also a symptom of their incapacity to understand, acknowledge, and transform their 
own `domestic' multiplicity.”68 This internal diversity in Europe must be celebrated and made 
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productive from an economic point of view instead of portraying the arrival of diversities in 
Europe as a threat to security and strangers' invasion. 
4.5 Border Imperialism 
The term “Border Imperialism” is borrowed from Harsha Walia's Undoing Border 
Imperialism published in 2013. The South Asian author uses the term imperialism, calling 
attention to the way borders are utilized and managed, emphasizing the connection between 
borders and colonialism. She questions the role of borders in our contemporary world and pushes 
us to rethink their primary functions. Borders are not simple delineations that separate one 
country from another; they are the place where displacement, racism, and exclusion happens. 
This is why it is crucial to understand the real function of borders and what they do to people. As 
a matter of fact, barriers are not natural, but they are artificially constructed by men with the 
specific objective of control, punish or exclude people. They are instruments of segregation, 
weapons in the hands of government and, in this case, of the EU.   
Walia's concept of Border Imperialism is here fundamental and can be applied to the 
European Union case. She sees borders as the place of conflicts, violence, and power:  
Border imperialism illuminates how colonial anxieties about identity and inclusion within 
Western borders are linked to the racist justifications for imperialist missions beyond 
Western borders that generate cycles of mass displacement. We are all, therefore, 
simultaneously separated by and bound together by the violences of border imperialism.69  
 
Walia's discourse illustrates how borders and the reinforcement of borders are the product of 
colonialism and the imperialist system; borders interrupt what is defined as borderless Europe. 
The author perceives borders as an obstacle preventing individuals from interacting and 
exchanging information and knowledge. She is calling into question the actions of government 
and institutions which have reintroduced borders and enforced them.  
 




In the middle of the European crisis, borders have become the symbol of European 
identity and the definition of what is not European or what must stay outside Europe. In addition 
to that, borders are where the image of the other is processed and created. As author Ammaturo 
sustains in her essay: “Albeit in different ways, the 'refugees/migrants crisis' and Brexit both 
require the conceptualization of 'the other' in order to function, be it the figure of the 'migrant', 
the 'terrorist', or the 'European stealing our jobs'.”70 Every identity construction needs the other's 
conceptualization to work, and during the refugee crisis, the other was identified with the refugee 
and the migrant.   
Her book analyzes the role of borders to discuss immigration's main issue; according to 
her, there is a strong colonial logic behind borders since lands do not belong to anyone, but it is 
more true that men belong to the land. The propriety or belonging of land to a specific category 
of people is what the rhetoric of colonialism used to invade indigenous lands.  She is committed 
to fighting state-imposed borders and immigration oppression that dived the rich from the poor, 
the white from black, or, in this case, the Europeans from the non-Europeans. Even if her case 
study is not specifically focused on Europe, I think her conceptualization of borders can be 
applied worldwide and to the European case study.  In her introduction, she says how:  
Border imperialism, which I propose as an alternative analytic framework, disrupts the 
myth of Western benevolence toward migrants. In fact, it wholly flips the script on 
borders; as journalist Dawn Paley aptly expresses it, 'Far from preventing violence, the 
border is in fact the reason it occurs.'  Border imperialism depicts the processes by which 
the violences and precarities of displacement and migration are structurally created as 
well as maintained.71 
 
Border imperialism illustrates how identity and inclusion within western borders are connected 
to racial justifications for imperialist missions. The violence of border imperialism lies in the fact 
 
70 Ammaturo, Francesca Romana. "Europe and whiteness: Challenges to European identity and European citizenship 
in light of Brexit and the ‘refugees/migrants crisis’." European Journal of Social Theory 22, no. 4 (2019): 556. 




that it is strictly related to colonialism, uniting and separating people at the same time. Walls are 
a system of oppression, and the author claims a free society in which borders do not restrict 
people. The author describes border imperialism as “Border imperialism is characterized by the 
entrenchment and reentrenchment of controls against migrants, who are displaced as a result of 
the violence of capitalism and empire, and subsequently forced into precarious labor as a result 
of state illegalization and systemic social hierarchies."72 She criticizes Western imperialism's role 
in displacing communities and people for capitalists and state interests, limiting the inclusion of 
migrants into westerns state through a process of criminalization and racialization toward 
immigrants. Western states are then accused of being mainly responsible for determining who 
should migrate and under what conditions. 
People have migrated from one side of the world to another since the existence of 
humanity. There has always been a need to move and a desire to immigrate; however, today, 
migration is more complicated, showing the inequality between the rich and the poor, the north 
or the south. Western imperialism is the most significant cause for displacement and people 
migration, meaning that western powers have interests in maintaining a sort of western empire, 
making it possible or impossible for nonwestern communities to migrate. Despite the 
humanitarian rhetoric used by western countries, countries such as the U.S and Europe have 
limited their acceptance of refugees in the last few years. As Walia says: “Contrary to popular 
belief about Western generosity and openness to refugees, over 80 percent of the world's 
refugees reside in neighboring countries within the global South.”73 The reality shows how only 
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a small minority of the refugee population worldwide is resettled in western countries, while 
most are welcomed in the global South. 
The topic of border control necessitates an investigation of Frontex, founded in 2004 as a 
substitution for the Italian project Mare Nostrum. Frontex is the central European agency with 
the task of border control, European Union's external fortification, and security inside the 
Schengen area. External borders in the EU have become more fragile and inconsistent in the last 
few years. Since borders are vacillating, control measures such as military aircraft have been 
employed to detect migrants. As Walia says: “The European network UNITED for Intercultural 
Action has documented 16,264 refugee deaths across Europe, most due to drowning at sea and 
suffocation in containers. Like migrant deaths at the US-Mexico border, this number represents 
the human face of border militarization policies as people are forced to seek out more clandestine 
and perilous routes.”74. The Mediterranean route has been defined by numerous international 
organizations as one of the most dangerous roads to cross for migrants; according to the United 
Nations, at least 33,761 people have died at sea or went missing from 2000 to 201775.  
Another essential process of border imperialism is, according to the author, the 
criminalization of migration and the construction of migrants as illegal and aliens. Western 
governments celebrate their openness and multiculturalism with the image of borderless Europe; 
however, parallel to this situation, there is the constant dehumanization and criminalization of 
migrants and refugees who come to Europe. Migrants, mostly undocumented or asylum seekers 
arriving illegally, are punished and deported or locked up in deportation centers. They are often 
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accused of crimes when in fact, they just crossed borders illegally. Borders automatically 
transform migrants into criminals or prisoners, creating narratives around migration as an illegal 
process. Politicians and media significantly contributed to this image of migrants as criminals or 
as a threat to the state's security. The author condemns practices of incarceration and exclusion 
often used by the western states to mark those considered undesirable for the country. We can 
see how borders construct different stories, narratives, and concepts of identities; whoever 
crossed the borders and come from the outside of Europe is automatically labeled as illegal or a 
criminal.  
The third construction inside border imperialism is the hierarchy of national and imperial 
identity belonging to the nation-state in which the outsiders are rejected. Whiteness and white 
supremacy are seen by the author as a dominating structure, deeply implicated in the concept of 
European identity, being one of the reasons why migrants and refugees are excluded from the 
system. It is a way to defend a system of exploitation and oppression and support a power 
system.    
The last structuring of border imperialism is the exploitation through media of migrant 
labor for capitalist interests. Workers without legal citizenship are a distinct category of work 
concerning border imperialism. Migrant workers are often forced to survive with horrible living 
and working conditions supported by the state. As Walia says:  
The state processes of illegalization of migrant and undocumented workers, through the 
denial of full legal status that forces a condition of permanent precarity, actually legalizes 
the trade in their bodies and labor by domestic capital. This strengthens the earlier 








 As we know, capitalism is trying to gain as much profit as possible from cheap labor and 
mechanisms to control and oppress them. In this case, migrants are included in the nation-state 
but in a limited way creating a sort of citizenship hierarchy in which they are positioned at the 
bottom of society and the economy. They are often paid less than the minimum wage and can not 
access essential social services: “Subjugation and exploitation are normalized against those 
marked as racial outsiders, and even more against those legally labelled as foreigners.”77 
According to her, Western governments support the exploitation of migrant workers to fulfill 
their capitalists' needs for cheap labor to keep in possession the nation-state's racialized national 
identity. Border imperialism is creating the conditions for mass displacements and the precarity 
of the migrant situation. Walls keep who is undesirable out of the nation-state, referring to a 
sense of exclusive identity as the nation-state's domination. For instance, European powers 
abolished borders to serve their economic interests but quickly reintroduced borders when 
migrants threaten their identity and culture. 
4.6 The Island of Lampedusa and Frontex  
When we talk about European borders referring to the migrant crisis, the Mediterranean 
Sea has become the symbol of a broken space. The Mediterranean separates Europe from the 
non-European countries, and the island of Lampedusa, located in Sicily, represents the 
conjunction between geography, European identity, and power. It is, in fact, one of the most 
important ports in Europe and the main route for refugees trying to reach the European shores. 
Lampedusa has become the symbol of the European refugee crisis and the representation of an 
identity crisis. Humans crossing the Mediterranean route are automatically dehumanized, 
opposed to a Europeanness concept, and represented as a threat to the European people. The 
 




Mediterranean borders are of fundamental importance because, from one side, they dehumanize 
immigrants and refugees coming to seek asylum or protection. From the other side, they produce 
knowledge on migrants, identifying them as the other, the enemy. As author Ammaturo says:  
 
Lampedusa, Calais, Melilla, Lesvos and Idomeni not only produce the conditions for the 
dehumanization of migrants and refugees, but they also create crucial forms of 
knowledge about the migrants' and refugees' 'radical otherness' that find wide recognition 
and acknowledgement in public discourses and end up feeding dominant narratives about 
Europeanness throughout the continent.78 
 
Lampedusa seems to be a perfect example to illustrate the concept of border imperialism 
depicted by Walia. Lampedusa has a central role in the construction of European identity and 
citizenship, but it has become a place of violence and death due to the unprecedented number of 
refugees crossing its border. The year 2015 is often considered among one of the deadliest years 
recorded in history by IOM for migrants and refugees crossing the Mediterranean. According to 
resources from IOM, more than 5,350 migrants died in 2015 with an increase of refugees’ arrival 
almost five times more than the previous year. April is considered the deadliest month in 2015 
with one of the worst tragedies that has ever happened in which a migrant boat sank at sea 
provoking the death of about 800 hundred migrants.79 Still today it is one of the most extensive 
single loss of life in the Mediterranean after decades. Only 28 people were able to survive the 
tragedy, and this is only the beginning of a series of tragedies that will mark the Mediterranean 
as a place of death and violence.80  
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At the same time, the island is the place where specific narratives around the role of 
European identity are developed, attributing negative connotations to the arrival of migrants 
though a negative press coverage of the migrant crisis. It is not a surprise the fact that European 
press plays a fundamental role in the refugee crisis and in the way their arrival is seen by the 
public. The majority of coverage seems to lean toward a negative image of migrants seen as 
outsiders and as in contrast to Europeans.81 There is a conflictual representation of refugees 
depicted as vulnerable people in need of help and often as dangerous outsiders. More 
specifically, the language used by media acquire a new importance in the crisis; the use of words 
such as "illegal," "invasion," "border security," "undocumented" contain strong connotations, 
alarming people and bringing them to think in a specific way than another. An example of a 
particular narrative created around migrants is identifying refugees with economic migrants 
coming to Europe looking for better job opportunities. Defining refugees as economic migrants 
can be very damaging because of refugees' international rights, giving the wrong idea to the 
general public, incapable of understanding the tragedy refugees have to go through. These 
narratives are usually used by far-right political parties in Europe to generate a sort of fear of the 
other among citizens, creating a rhetoric of crisis able to spread all around Europe.  
From these narratives produced by the media, we can construct a specific image of the migrant. 
Lampedusa builds a particular representation of immigrants and migration in Europe, but it is 
also a mirror for the same Europe; it reflects its image and construction. As Ammaturo says: “As 
the recent vote on the exit of the United Kingdom from the European Union in 2016 
demonstrates, the border (or lack thereof) acquires a new ideological significance as an essential 
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tool of demarcation or proximity to the European Union.”82 The absence of a clear line of 
demarcation in Europe is one reason why a growing number of Schengen member states 
reintroduced temporary border controls on several occasions back in 2015. The aim was to limit 
the flow of migrants and refugees and to prevent the possibility of terrorists gaining access to the 
countries. An example was Austria that reintroduced border controls similar to the pre-Schengen 
control on their Italian border to prevent refugees from crossing the borders and going outside 
Italy. According to the Schengen Agreement, borders can be reintroduced only to exceptional 
circumstances based on the case's commission application. In 2016, borders were introduced in 
various parts of Europe. Still, if some borders introduction was valid, there are also cases of 
violation of the EU law, such as the Austrian control of its border with Italy. Once again, crises 
seem to show the fragility of a solidary spirit, identity, and unity among member states.  
In 2005, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency was founded, known today as 
Frontex, a collaborative project to help coordinate and manage external borders. The main goal 
was ensuring the safety and well function of external borders, providing security and protection. 
Frontex represents a critical factor in handling migrants and asylum seekers with increased 
agency's strict security practices. The link between security and migration has become more 
pressing in the last few years, and Frontex contributed to the securitization of migration through 
its methods. European governments have invested a considerable amount of money in 
strengthening border security, including sophisticated technologies such as aerial systems, 
camera surveillance systems, computerized databases, and more.83 New cooperations represented 
an essential development for the Frontex operations, involving other actors dealing withs 
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security issues such as the North-Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). NATO ships started to 
conduct surveillance and monitor Turkey’s and Greece's waters, providing information to 
Frontex. Frontex was also in charge of return those migrants that did not need protection and 
were taking advantage of the migration crisis to enter Europe. Despite the work Frontex has 
done, there are numerous limitations regarding its role. For instance, it does not have 
supranational competencies, and it is strictly connected to European bureaucracy. Moreover, 
back in 2015, Frontex was not powerful enough. According to author Peter Nedgar in his essay 
“Borders and the EU legitimacy problem: the 2015–16 European Refugee Crisis”:  
However, the problems in this regard were the following in 2015–16 (Lehne 2016a, 
2016b): 1) Frontex was far from powerful enough, 2) Frontex had insufficient EU 
funding, 3) the national authorities have not always been particularly cooperative 
regarding Frontex, and 4) there was a fatal "soft," laissez-faire approach overshadowing 
the entire EU for the entry of persons into Greece and Italy, contrary to what – according 
to Schmitt – should characterize a state-like feature like the Schengen cooperation.84 
 
Consequently, Frontex lacked enough power to manage the refugee crisis and the border controls 
properly. Author Peter Nedgar takes a very different position than the other authors, such as 
Walia, advocating for rigid border control and stringent measures. He concludes his essay by 
saying: “Well-functioning states require borders. Porous boundaries between countries 
undermine the rule of law, security and welfare systems, as the few countries offering these 
things are quickly overrun by people from countries that do not enjoy such good fortune. The 
countries offering such things would therefore have to abandon them sooner or later.”85  
 Nevertheless, a series of reports published by Human Rights Watch shows the complicity 
of Frontex in human abuses and unlawful actions. Border officers have constantly violated 
international laws that require the protection of refugees arriving on European soil without 
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respecting fundamental human rights. More specifically, Frontex has been accused of human 
rights abuses at Greece’s borders when a media group published, on October 2020, a report 
investigating the Frontex’s operations at the Aegean Sea. According to the report, migrants and 
refugees were pushed back and forced to stay away from the EU waters. It is not the first time 
that something like this happened; Frontex has been the center of criticism for a long time from 
international organizations denouncing its human rights abuses, specifically the constant 
pushbacks and return of migrant and asylum seekers from Greece to Turkey. Human Rights 
Watch reports have also pointed out the use of violence against migrants and the confiscation of 
their belongings. When Human Rights Watch required answers for their actions, Frontex claimed 
that no abuses were ever recorded, denying the existence of what was evident. Not only Human 
Rights Watch but also IOM and the UNHCR expressed their concerns over the reports 
denouncing the constant expulsion of migrants from the European coasts. Despite the concrete 
evidence of international laws violations reported by several international organizations, Frontex 
denied that any forms of human rights abuses took place.86    
4.7 Toward a Fortress Europe?  
The formation of a Fortress Europe was nearly inevitable due to the chaotic response of 
the EU to the arrival of refugees. Fortress Europe is both a concrete and metaphorical term, 
giving the idea of physical walls from one side and a metaphor of power and oppression of 
refugees from the other, closely correlated to Europe's borders' increasing securitization. 
Different metaphors have been created through the years to describe and powerfully represent 
the hardening of Europe's external borders against undocumented immigrants and refugees. 
 





Sometimes, it is referred to as “The Wall” or “The Golden Curtain”87 to describe the limitation 
imposed on certain categories of people's mobility. More recently, the fortress metaphor 
originated in the Second World War context has been used to represent Europe's new security 
measures to protect external borders from unwanted immigrants.  
“Fortress Europe” is a compelling term used by media and politicians to represent the 
rigidity of European borders in the last few years. Europe has been depicted as a fortress for 
immigrants and refugees in which access to its soil has become more and more difficult.  
The term is frequently used by writer and journalist Matthew Carr. Using Carr's words taken 
from his article on “The Trouble with Fortress Europe”:  
For more than two decades now, the European Union has been conducting the most 
extensive, sophisticated and far-reaching border enforcement programme in history, 
largely in an attempt to prevent 'illegal' immigration – a category that generally refers to 
undocumented 'economic migrants' and refugees from poor countries and the Third 
World.88 
 
As a matter of fact, thousands and thousands of asylum seekers have been trapped in this new 
system, unable to become part of Europe or any other society. Others have been confined in a 
state of limbo or homelessness inside the most important European cities, in the attempt to 
preserve and maintain a system in which unwanted people are excluded with the justification of a 
threat of losing European identity. In addition to that, millions of euros have been spent to 
reinforce border controls with border guards, police, aircraft, agencies, and other measures to 
reinforce fortress Europe.  
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The EU's wish to end irregular arrivals of migrants in the Mediterranean posed the basis 
for a new and intense partnership with the African countries, the countries of origin for migrants 
that arrive in Europe. It shows how the migration crisis is still the center of European foreign 
policy and how the EU tries to give a new and coordinated dimension to European immigration 
policy. In November 2015, the EU invited their African partners to the Valletta Summit to 
establish a shared responsibility and strong solidarity in managing migration flows with intense 
cooperation to prevent irregular migration.  An example is represented by the Emergency Trust 
Fund for Africa (EUTF), introduced in 2015 as a temporary emergency response for five years to 
increase collaboration with African countries and sharing responsibilities for migration issues. 
Cooperation with countries of origin, transit, and destination has been central to the EU policies 
on migration in the past few years. 
Nevertheless, the Fund has some limitations represented by the fact that is mainly 
controlled by Europeans who imposed their objectives with little involvement of Africa 
countries. It seems that Europeans and African countries' interests are different, if not even 
conflicting. From one side, Europeans want better cooperation with African countries to return 
illegal immigrants, reinforce fortress Europe, and control irregular migration in general. On the 
other side, Africa countries wish to develop migration channels to the EU, a sort of 
regularization of illegal migrants, and new opportunities for legal migration with the risk of 
further destabilize EU migration policies. Returning illicit migrants has been on the EU's plan for 
a long time; however, returning immigrants is a more sensitive issue for African countries that 
are impacted too by the process of return.89 
 
89 TARDIS, Matthieu, and Laurence NARDON. “European Union Partnerships with African Countries on 






In his book Fortress Europe: Inside the War Against Immigration, Carr portrays the 
repression of immigrants and refugees, criticizing the Common European Asylum policy. He 
points out the irony behind the idea of borderless Europe, the fact that Europe celebrates its 
borderless character, still it acts with the hardening of border policy which has increased human 
trafficking, abuse, assaults, and organized crime. Carr also criticized the powerful and damaging 
role of media and politicians toward the arrival of immigrants. The hardening of European 
borders is connected to the problem of undocumented immigration, misuse of laws, and abuse of 
geographical position, exposing the paradox and contradictions inside the immigration policies in 
Europe and other countries. Once again, at the center of criticism and paradox, there is the 
Schengen Agreement, structured to build a continent without internal borders. It is the basis for 
free borders in Europe, and it came to include countries like Switzerland and Norway, which are 
not part of the EU. It aims at abolishing border controls on European soil, allowing citizens to 
move freely from one member state to another. The Schengen Area will operate with external 
border controls imposed on international travelers from outside Europe but no internal border 
controls. As authors Tanja A. Börzel and Thomas Risse state in their conclusion to “From the 
Europe to the Schengen Crises: European Integration theories, politicization, and identity 
politics”: “To prevent illegal immigration, the EU has built a set of far-reaching border control 
and enforcement policies. But it doesn't work: today's 'Fortress Europe' is an inefficient, immoral 
and costly bureaucratic construction that should be urgently reformed.”90 The Agreement was 
meant to create a borderless Europe where borders do not matter as they used to in the past, 
heading to a post-national institution able to go beyond the age of nationalism. Paradoxically, 
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this situation of borderless Europe has created the premises for Fortress Europe with the risk of 
falling into fascism.  
Greece, Italy, and the island of Lampedusa, in particular, are the center of fortress 
Europe. These countries located in the Mediterranean are the most affected by the Dublin 
Convention. As we mentioned before, the Dublin Convention is a fundamental part of the EU 
asylum system and established how migrants should be resettled in Europe, putting most 
responsibilities on migrants in the Southern part of Europe. The Dublin Convention came into 
force in 1997; however, in the last few years, where the phenomenon of immigration became 
urgent, changes and modifications were added to it. In substance, every asylum application 
should be processed by one member state, the member state in which refugees come first. Due to 
their geographical position near Africa and the Middle East, Greece and Italy are enormously 
disadvantaged from the Dublin Convention. For instance, Italy has received the third highest 
asylum requests in the world after the U.S and Germany in both 2016 and 2017 according to the 
UNHCR. The country has received just in 2015 and 2016 a number of 153,842 and 181,436 sea 
arrivals with 2,913 people missing or dead in 2015 and 4,578 in 2016.91 On the other hand, 
Greece received the highest number of refugees in 2015 with 853,723 sea arrivals with a sharp 
decrease in 2016 with 173,450 people, mostly due to the Turkey-EU agreement in 2016. This 
situation is critical since it transforms Greece, Italy, and Spain into countries of migration for the 
first time in their history, after always being considered countries of emigration in which people 
flew looking for better economic opportunities outside. This may also partially justify their 
incapability of dealing with the crisis in the first place.  
 





We said several times how European identity is represented by sharing a common set of 
values with which citizens can identify. Among these values, Christianity has often been seen as 
an identity marker of the European Union and a fundamental unity element. The reference to 
Christianity has been abused by politicians who claim the exclusion of countries such as Turkey 
from the EU, reflecting European attitudes toward the Islamic world. A perfect example citied, 
already numerous, times is represented by the case of Turkey and its constant exclusion from 
Fortress Europe. Politicians and statemen expressed their concern in the idea of Turkey joining 
the EU, emphasizing the main difference defined by religion. Turkey is one of the most 
important countries for the European Union due for its geographical position and historical 
reasons. Relationship between the two are represented by cooperation from one side, and 
conflicts from the other. Turkey also applied for EU membership back in 1987 and it was 
rejected by the EU for democratic discrepancies present in the democratic system. As we said 
before, religion often plays a more important role than it seems when it comes to exclusion of 
countries from the EU. The EU architects conceived an idea of Europe based on Christianity as 
the main religion and the accession of Turkey, a country whose population is entirely Muslim, 
has often been seen as difficult. Europe is today largely secular where different religions 
coexisting in the same continent; however there seem to be a strong Christian heritage that 
represents a powerful influence. There has always been a strong opposition to Turkish accession; 
for the most religious countries its accession is seen as against the idea of Europe as founded on 
Christian principles; while for the most nonreligious member states it can undermine the free 
lifestyle of the continent representing a possible threat to European culture and identity.  
There are still conflicting views on the possible accession of Turkey in the EU and 




Europe. We know how religion is not a valid argument for a European identity since it 
encompasses different faiths under the same Union; nevertheless, Christianity has been used for 
quite a long time as an instrument of unity among member states. Turkey's accession to the EU 
depends on other fundamental reasons beyond religion; however, the high level of anxiety 
around the idea of Turkey becoming integral part of the EU shows us how European identity is 
once again more exclusive than inclusive and welcoming toward diversities.   
The term Fortress Europe is also used to depict border security and police. The author 
describes police brutality and guards who embody violent figures, usually making borders 
challenging to access. Sometimes, they directly or indirectly support human traffickers and are 
aware of the situation behind the arrival of refugees. Sometimes, they are the reason why 
refugees and asylum seekers are denied access, not allowing undocumented migrants to enter 
without any right to do so, abusing the law system for their benefits.  
Authors Sara Marino and Simon Dawes, in their essay “Introduction to Fortress Europe: 
Media, Migration and Borders”, states how the rise of global terrorism and organized crime have 
been the biggest threat to the European identity, contributing to the development of a generalized 
sentiment of fear shifting the debate around migration from control to security. In particular, 
after 9/11, immigration has come to symbolize the dangers of terrorism and the invasion of 
people coming from the outside, with a diffused feeling of instability and the fear of losing a 
common type of identity and political cohesion. Most importantly, the majority of citizens see 
the contamination of Europe's national identity. The feeling of a shared identity threatened, often 
supported by media and newspapers, provoked the rise of populist rhetoric in public discourses 




insecurity and anxiety among the states and their citizens. Authors Marino and Dawes describe 
the use of Fortress Europe as:  
First, the term refers to a global displacement crisis, with more people than ever before 
fleeing conflict, violence, and violations of basic human rights, particularly from the 
Middle East. Second, it calls into question the crisis of EU migration management and 
the supposed failure of the European project. The chaotic and often tragic consequences 
of Europe's 'managed migration' policies in Lampedusa in 2013 and more recently in 
Greece and along the West Balkan route – just to name some of the case studies analyzed 
by our contributors – have called into question the effectiveness of the European model 
and its human and political costs.92 
 
The term refers to the fact that masses of people flee from their home to other countries due to 
human rights violations, especially from the Middle East. Second, it refers to how Europe 
manages the current crisis, exposing the fragility of the European integration project and 
European identity. Thousands of lives were lost in fortress Europe, shocking the European public 
opinion together with the increased number of deportation and police brutality at the borders. On 
the other side, the hardening of European borders is the direct consequence of the inability to 
manage immigration and a Common European Asylum policy's failure. As most authors agree, 
such as Carr or Marino and Dawes, Europe's borders represent the system's failure. European 
migration policies did not stop migrants from entering the EU, but they just made their journey 
more dangerous with the tragic consequence that thousands of people die at sea. Secondly, 
Europe was incapable of showing solidarity and unity between member states to coordinate the 
way refugees can be managed and welcomed. Europe instead demonstrated to the world to be a 
very divided continent with an incoherent framework. Member states were divided on how the 
emergency should have been dealt with, disputing which countries should accept more migrants. 
In the meantime, people were dying trying to reach European shores. Fortress Europe seems to 
 





have created a physical barrier and an emotional one due to Europe's sense of humanity and the 
number of lives lost. The EU's inability to manage the emergency and accommodate refugees is 
considered a symbol of the European identity crisis, a crisis deeply felt all around Europe.      
The efforts to control migrants and enforce borders are in contrast with values of human rights, 
solidarity, and inclusion that the EU has defined as the core to its political identity.  
The tragic loss of refugees and migrants in the Mediterranean Sea is putting into question the 
idea of inclusion and solidarity of Europe together with its humanism toward refugees. A more 
humane immigration policy is necessary to transform refugees into a positive and beneficial 



















Europe has been going through a series of crises in the last decades, culminating with the 
UK officially leaving the EU with Brexit in 2016. Many scholars have sustained how these 
emergencies posed a threat for the EU's future with an existential identity crisis and a profound 
questioning of the European integration project.  
The refugee emergency in particular showed the fragility and lack of unity among 
member states with the migration of such a massive number of people. The migration crisis, also 
referred to as the Schengen crisis, has been characterized by the constant EU's inability to 
respond in an efficient and coordinated way to the influx of refugees and migrants, which is 
unprecedented in the modern history of Europe. The migration phenomenon has generated a 
crisis in a series of different domains. First of all, it is a humanitarian crisis related to the 
incapability of respecting the fundamental human rights of migrants who have been constantly 
dehumanized as objects in national governments' hands. Secondly, it is a public health crisis for 
the generation of epidemics and other diseases due to the terrible health conditions refugees are 
obliged to live in refugee camps. It is also a demographic crisis since Europe faces the arrival of 
vast masses of migrants and residents never seen before. We can also consider the migration 
crisis as an economic and political crisis. The government struggles to manage the influx of 
refugees with the direct consequence of the rise of populism and other far-right political parties.  
Finally, as we extensively discussed in the chapters above, the Schengen crisis is a 
security crisis due to the threat represented by crime and a threat for European identity and 
culture.93 The problem of a European identity crisis and European integration project has been 
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my thesis's primary focus.  The EU always has exalted values of inclusiveness and celebration of 
diverse cultures as the basis for a common identity in Europe and the beginning of a post-
national institution able to go beyond single national member states. However, the migration 
crisis has shown the fragility of an integration project with a lack of solidarity among member 
states, excluding non-European populations identified as the other or the enemy entering the 
European soil. The rhetoric of exclusion of migrants was abused by politicians and media who 
saw the phenomenon as a threat to Western values with a decrease of support from the public 
opinion to the EU integration project and the rise of Eurosceptic parties.Moreover, standard 
European integration and identity theories do not explain the EU responses to the Schengen 
crisis. The majority of treaties and official documents issued by the European Commission exalt 
values of democracy, religious freedom, human rights protection, multiculturalism, and 
multilingualism as the basis for citizens to identify with a common integration project. These 
values were completely forgotten with refugees' arrival, posing the problem of who is inside 
Europe and who is identified as the other, outside fortress Europe. 
The crisis also shows the contradictions around the role of borders, with the Schengen 
agreement promoting free borders and mobility among citizens and the rapid reintroduction of 
walls with the arrival of migrants to confine them in a specific geographical area.  
As Author Thomas Risse explains in his A Community of Europeans, there is a 
substantial difference between citizens with Europeanized or inclusive identities and citizens 
with exclusive national identities. For instance, people with exclusive nationalist identities are 
more likely to be hostile toward migrants and xenophobic. We can see how the small minority of 
the population more likely to identify with Europe, and a European identity will have more 




One of my thesis's main conclusions is that a European identity is still in the making and 
is not clearly developed. Constructing common identities is a very complicated and lengthy 
process. The European integration project has been in progress since the mid-'60s and became a 
topic of fundamental importance in the '70s. For this reason, some scholars think it is too early to 
talk about a European identity entirely and fully developed. National identities took hundreds 
and hundreds of years to evolve and grow, while Europeans have been interacting with each 
other for less than a hundred years inside a political entity. Another important factor is 
represented by the younger population that demonstrates, according to Eurobarometer results, a 
stronger attachment to the EU and Europe in general. They usually have better education, they 
travel around Europe and speak more languages. The Erasmus Project, allowing them to live and 
study in a different country inside the EU, may be one reason why they are more prone to have a 
Europeanized identity. Consequently, in the future, there is a higher possibility that Europeans 
will be more united and have a better understating of other cultures with a more vital European 
spirit. For author Ana-Maria Bolborici, it is too early to refer to a common European identity; 
however, Europeans will be more interested in traveling and knowing other cultures with the 
evolving field of education. She cites Jurgen Habermas, a German philosopher who sustained 
and promoted the idea of a European constitution, to conclude that: “the European identity will 
become a reality, a reality having as pillars the solidarity focused at widespread sense of 
belonging to this space, but also at the involvement based on a collective identity explicitly built, 
this could occur if Europe will wants to speak with one voice at the foreign affairs level and to 
pursue an active internal politics” (……)  The event's history proves that the different histories 




from each other, terrorist attacks claimed by the Islamic organization ISIS in the last few months 
being the most recent example in this regard.”94 
Another main conclusion is that migration issues are strictly connected to identitarian and 
cultural feelings. The Schengen crisis resulted in a collapse and disintegration of a common 
asylum and migration policy. The result was an identity crisis in which the distinction between 
Us vs. the Other became more urgent and pressing to define. Right-wing political parties saw the 
occasion to mobilize anti-immigration sentiments among exclusive nationalists. The role of 
borders in Europe and the Mediterranean Sea is of fundamental importance as the place where 
the idea of Europeanness is generated. For this reason, the principal contradiction that the 
refugee crisis brought is the idea of an open and multicultural Europe from one side, and a 
nationalistic, exclusive, and close Europe from the other, which helped produce the concept of 
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